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SUMMARY
Currently, the growing number of REST web services on the Internet exposes more vulner-
abilities that attackers can exploit. Connectedness, extensibility, and the increasing com-
plexity of systems are three of the main reasons why REST web services become more vul-
nerable to these exploits.
Prior research shows that the model-based whitebox fuzzing approach is more effective
on program binaries when comparing it with the model-based blackbox and traditional
whitebox approach. Furthermore, research has proven that model-based fuzzing is effec-
tive on REST web services. Within this thesis, a model-based whitebox fuzzer prototype is
developed. With this prototype, it is possible to answer the research question if the model-
based whitebox fuzzing approach is more effective than a model-based blackbox approach
and a traditional whitebox fuzzing approach on REST web services.
The use of empirical and quantitative research helps to answer this question. The re-
search starts with studies in different areas. The first study shows the vulnerabilities in
REST web services that are fuzzable for a model-based whitebox fuzzer. The results show
that the vulnerabilities that are fuzzable for the model-based whitebox fuzzer in REST web
services are HTTPS, access control, injection, validating content types, error handling and
exposing sensitive information in HTTP requests. A second study explains how this re-
search can use the model-based whitebox fuzzing approach from prior research for the
model-based whitebox fuzzer for REST web services. The results show that the prototype
can use the same processes as in the original approach. The methods within the fuzzing
approach for creating the test inputs are target selection, file cracking, file stitching and file
repair. Some changes have been made to use the OpenAPI specification instead of program
binaries, but a similar approach is achievable. The last study shows the metrics that need
to be used to compare fuzzing methods. These metrics are code coverage, valid requests,
executed tests, and the number of revealed vulnerabilities. This research uses these metrics
to ultimately analyse the performed experiments.
The model-based whitebox fuzzer prototype outperforms the traditional whitebox fuzzer
and the model-based blackbox fuzzer when running tests with WooCommerce and Drupal
as test programs. The results show that the model-based whitebox fuzzing prototype is
overall more effective than the other two fuzzers. The prototype achieved a higher code
coverage and generated more valid requests on both target programs. An explanation for
these results is that the prototype is stateful and uses previous responses to create new in-
puts to reach deeper within the SUT. By contrast, the traditional whitebox fuzzer creates
only valid requests for WooCommerce but could not perform a valid request on Drupal.
During the experiments, several vulnerabilities are discovered, e.g., full path disclosure and
HTTPS. However, none of these vulnerabilities is new. They were discovered and patched in
the past. This may be due to the large, well-developed testing programs this research uses.
Newer projects may be more about undetected vulnerabilities because a smaller group is
working on this. Future research could add other techniques to extend the model-based




Momenteel legt het groeiende aantal REST webservices op internet meer kwetsbaarheden
bloot die aanvallers kunnen misbruiken. Verbondenheid, uitbreidbaarheid en de toene-
mende complexiteit van systemen zijn drie van de belangrijkste redenen waarom REST-
webservices kwetsbaarder worden voor deze aanvallen.
Eerder onderzoek toont aan dat de op modellen gebaseerde whitebox fuzzing aanpak
effectiever is voor programma-binaire bestanden in vergelijking met de modelgebaseerde
blackbox en traditionele whitebox aanpak. Bovendien heeft onderzoek aangetoond dat
modelgebaseerd fuzzen effectief is op REST-webservices. Binnen dit proefschrift wordt een
modelgebaseerd whitebox fuzzer prototype ontwikkeld. Met dit prototype is het mogelijk
om de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden of de modelgebaseerde whitebox fuzzing aan-
pak effectiever is dan een modelgebaseerde blackbox aanpak en een traditionele whitebox
fuzzing aanpak op REST webservices.
Het gebruik van empirisch en kwantitatief onderzoek helpt om deze vraag te beantwo-
orden. Het onderzoek begint met onderzoeken op verschillende gebieden. De eerste studie
toont de kwetsbaarheden in REST webservices die fuzzable zijn voor een modelgebaseerde
whitebox fuzzer. De resultaten laten zien dat de kwetsbaarheden die fuzzable zijn voor de
modelgebaseerde whitebox fuzzer in REST webservices zijn: HTTPS, toegangscontrole, in-
jectie, valideren van inhoudstypen, foutafhandeling en het blootleggen van gevoelige infor-
matie in HTTP verzoeken. Een tweede studie legt uit hoe dit onderzoek gebruik kan maken
van de modelgebaseerde whitebox fuzzing aanpak uit eerder onderzoek voor de model-
gebaseerde whitebox fuzzer voor REST webservices. De resultaten laten zien dat het pro-
totype dezelfde processen kan gebruiken als in de oorspronkelijke aanpak. De methoden
binnen de fuzzing aanpak voor het maken van de testinvoer zijn de doellocatie bepalen,
het opbreken van invoeren, het samenvoegen van invoeren en het herstellen van invoeren.
Er zijn enkele wijzigingen aangebracht om de OpenAPI specificatie te gebruiken in plaats
van programma-binaire bestanden, maar een vergelijkbare aanpak is toegepast. De laat-
ste studie toont de meetwaarden die moeten worden gebruikt om fuzzing methoden te
vergelijken. Deze meetwaarden zijn codedekking, geldige verzoeken, uitgevoerde tests en
het aantal kwetsbaarheden dat is onthuld. Deze meetwaarden zijn uiteindelijk gebruikt om
de uitgevoerden experimenten te analyseren.
Het modelgebaseerde whitebox fuzzer prototype presteert beter dan de traditionele
whitebox fuzzer en de modelgebaseerde blackbox fuzzer bij het uitvoeren van tests op
WooCommerce en Drupal als testprogramma’s. De resultaten laten zien dat het modelge-
baseerde whitebox fuzzing prototype over het algemeen effectiever is dan de andere twee
fuzzers. Het prototype bereikte een hogere codedekking en genereerde meer geldige ver-
zoeken op beide testprogramma’s. Een verklaring voor deze resultaten is dat het prototype
stateful is en eerdere reacties gebruikt om nieuwe inputs te creëren om dieper in de functies
van testprogramma’s te komen. De traditionele whitebox fuzzer creëert alleen geldige ver-
zoeken voor WooCommerce, maar kon geen geldig verzoek uitvoeren op Drupal. Tijdens
de experimenten worden verschillende kwetsbaarheden ontdekt, bijvoorbeeld volledige
vi
padonthulling en HTTPS. Geen van deze kwetsbaarheden is echter nieuw. Ze zijn in het
verleden ontdekt en verholpen. Dit kan te wijten zijn aan de grote, goed ontwikkelde pro-
gramma’s die dit onderzoek gebruikt. Nieuwere projecten beschikken wellicht vaker over
ongedetecteerde kwetsbaarheden, omdat hier een kleinere groep mee bezig is. Toekom-
stig onderzoek zou andere technieken kunnen toevoegen om de op modellen gebaseerde
whitebox fuzzer uit te breiden. Bijvoorbeeld broncode analyse om meer kwetsbaarheid-




The Internet plays a central role in the world today. However, the growing number of avail-
able web services and applications on the Internet exposes more bugs and vulnerabilities
for people with bad intentions. A bug is when the system is not behaving as it is supposed
to, whereas a vulnerability is a bug that manifests itself as an opportunity for exploita-
tion [21]. An increasing number of vulnerabilities in web services is the result of this.
When attackers exploit these vulnerabilities, the exploitations of these vulnerabilities
could lead to severe damage. In addition, various threats to confidentiality and integrity ex-
ist, which means that confidential information is accessible and unauthorised actors could
taint this information. In terms of web services, these web services could leak account in-
formation or send false data to the web service, which affects the system or others. This
means that even though web services can be beneficial, they also provide a risk. These
issues have evolved; connectedness, extensibility, and complexity together contribute to
how problems have evolved [37].
Firstly, there are more computer systems connected to the Internet. Initially, traditional
computers and laptops are connected to the Internet. This was followed by connecting
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. Nowadays, the Internet-of-Things (IoT)
and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [18] used for customer products like televisions and
webcams connected to the Internet. Connectedness is the term that stands for our society
increasingly depending on Internet communication. Unfortunately, as systems connect to
the Internet, they become more vulnerable to attacks. This is because attackers no longer
need physical access to a system to exploit it. In addition, some of the existing systems
never intended to connect to the Internet. This results in systems that do not have or lack
built-in security measures[37].
Secondly, extensibility implies that software can update or extend[37]. To better un-
derstand this term and add more context to it regarding web services, web services can be
extended with additional endpoints or updated with a new .NET 1 version. Extensibility
is great from functional and economic viewpoints. Extensibility is also great for distribut-
ing patches for software applications to improve software security. However, preventing
systems against vulnerabilities becomes challenging when added extensions or updates
introduce the vulnerabilities. This could happen when the extensions become more com-
plex. These vulnerabilities are adopted and are most often only fixable for the supplier of
1https://dotnet.microsoft.com/
1
the extension. Users remain dependent on the suppliers of these extensions/updates. For
example, if the extension uses a system interface and the system does not seal it properly by
default. Then this vulnerability is exploitable until the extension supplier seals it properly.
Thirdly, software systems have increased in size and complexity significantly. The secu-
rity levels of the underlying systems and third-party components impact the security levels
of the web service itself. As the complexity of these systems and third-party components
increases, so does the chance for vulnerabilities within them[37]. This vulnerability could
potentially open up a vulnerability for the web service.
Vulnerabilities are available for all types of web services. This includes Representational
State Transfer [18] (REST) web services. REST is a software architectural style. Most often,
a web service uses the REST architecture, and it uses a subset of HTTP. The REST architec-
ture builds on a client-server communication pattern. A set of design principles (see para-
graph 2.1) indicates how to correctly apply the REST software architectural style. Within
these design principles, addressability, statelessness, and uniform interface are the most
characteristic.
There are different methods to document the specification of the REST web services.
All of these methods have in common that they are understandable for both humans as
machines. This makes it possible for machines to understand what is possible to do with
the REST web service and show the possibilities to human readers.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)2 is an organisation that works to
improve software security. This party frequently makes a list of the most occurring threats
to web services and other software projects. Within those lists, it is easy to see which vulner-
abilities attackers are most often trying to target. The OWASP also monitors REST security.
The OWASP provides a top 10 vulnerabilities [4] and a penetration test strategy [6] for REST
web services.
There are several methods to discover vulnerabilities within programs. Fuzzing is one
of them. Fuzzing is an effective and widely used technique for finding vulnerabilities in
software [11]. Using this technique could help to discover a vulnerability before an attacker
does and perhaps exploits it. The fuzzing tool, fuzzer, create inputs and sends these to
the system under test (SUT). This technique may trigger a vulnerability inside the system.
Most often, the fuzzer reports the vulnerability to the executor of the fuzzer. The inputs
used can be syntactically or semantically incorrect. The fuzzer monitors the behaviour and
response of the SUT when the created input is processed. While the fuzzer monitors the
SUT, vulnerabilities can occur, and the fuzzer logs them.
Currently, there are three types to categorise a fuzzer. A fuzzer can be a blackbox, a
greybox or a whitebox. The level of program understanding should be analysed to place a
fuzzer within a group. A whitebox fuzzer almost has a complete program understanding of
the SUT, and a blackbox fuzzer does not know what is inside the SUT. The greybox fuzzer
falls between those two. Based on the level of program understanding, it leans more to
whitebox or blackbox.
There are different methods to generate the input that the fuzzer uses during the fuzzing
process. There are two approaches for input generation. It can be a mutation-based method
or a generation-based approach. In the case of mutation-based, mutations are performed
on an initial seed to create new inputs. For the generation-based approach, block-, model-
or grammar-based approaches are available. With those options, the fuzzer can generate
2https://owasp.org/
2
inputs that follow a pattern. Usually, this results in more inputs that are valid for the SUT.
Currently, no research combines model-based whitebox fuzzing with REST web ser-
vices. Since REST is a frequently used architecture, it is worth investigating this fuzzing
method on REST web services. This research combines some techniques to validate if
model-based whitebox fuzzing works for detecting vulnerabilities in REST web services.
The research of Pham et al.[32] shows that model-based whitebox fuzzing is a more
effective method for fuzzing project binaries than model-based blackbox fuzzing and tra-
ditional whitebox fuzzing. This research aims to validate if model-based whitebox fuzzing
is a more effective method than model-based blackbox fuzzing and traditional whitebox
fuzzing when applied on a REST web service. A prototype is developed to reach this goal,
but first, a study covers how the approach of Pham et al.[32] could be used on REST web
services. The developed prototype performs several tests on different systems under test
(SUTs). Additionally, performance metrics should be studied to compare fuzzing systems.
Comparing the performance metrics of the model-based whitebox fuzzer with the model-
based blackbox fuzzer and traditional whitebox fuzzer gives more insight into how effective
it is.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• A proposal for a model-based whitebox approach that is capable of detecting vulner-
abilities in REST web services.
• A prototype for model-based whitebox fuzzing REST web services based on the pro-
posed approach.
• An evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed approach based on metrics. This
evaluation uses several applications with REST web service as a SUT.
Besides validating a model-based whitebox fuzzing approach on REST web services,
this research provides a new fuzzing approach for REST web services. Furthermore, this
approach is built explicitly for REST web services instead of program binaries. In addi-
tion, this approach is based on the specification of REST web services. This specification
is readable for both humans and machines. Program binaries are readable for machines,
binaries are written in machine language. This makes the proposed approach easier to un-
derstand for humans. Possibly, future research could validate this approach on other types
of projects or extend the prototype with other fuzzing techniques on REST web services.
The remainder of the thesis covers several subjects. Chapter 2, background, contains
more and more detailed background information. This background information covers
the topics fuzzing, REST, model-based testing and model-based whitebox fuzzing. Chap-
ter 3, research, covers the research questions, chosen research method and an explanation
of how the prototype is tested. Chapter 4, literature study, consists of two studies. The
first study covers the vulnerabilities that are available for REST web services. Also, for each
vulnerability, it is mentioned how the developers can prevent the vulnerability and if the
vulnerability is fuzzable. The last study covers the different available metrics to compare
fuzzing methods. Chapter 5 explains how the model-based whitebox fuzzer prototype is
eventually built during this thesis. This also covers how the methods used in model-based
blackbox and traditional whitebox fuzzing can be combined to create a model-based white-
box fuzzer for REST web services. Finally, this chapter also contains the results of the exper-
iments. Also, the implementation of the prototype is described together with the results of
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the experiments. Chapter 6, discussion, conclusion and future work, include the answers
of this research to the research questions. Also, this chapter discusses directions for further
research on this subject. Finally, chapter 7, reflection, contains a reflection on the actions




Prior research provides background information that helps to understand the used tech-
niques within this thesis. Therefore, this chapter describes those techniques. This chap-
ter covers REST web services, fuzzing in general, model-based testing, and model-based
whitebox fuzzing.
2.1. REST WEB SERVICES
Representational State Transfer (REST) is a description of an architectural style. The
REST architecture is most often used for web services. The REST architecture results in
client-server communication. This means that the client sends a request to the server, the
server processes these messages and returns responses. REST messages most likely consist
of an XML or JSON format and are transported using HTTP. Figure 2.1 presents an overview
of the communication flow.
Figure 2.1: REST communication adapted from Phpflow.com1
Design principles of REST include addressability, statelessness, and uniform interface [29].
Additionally, client-server, cache, layered system, and code-on-demand are other design
principles use within REST.
• Client-Server In a client-server design, the client sends a request to the server. The
server processes the request and returns a response to the client. The separation of
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concerns is the reason behind this design principle[13]. This improves the portability
of the user interface and improves scalability by simplifying the server components.
• Addressability With addressability, REST models the datasets to operate on and presents
these datasets as resources.
• Uniform interface REST uses uniform interfaces to access the REST resources us-
ing a fixed set of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) methods. Typically, REST web
services use the GET, PUT, POST, and DELETE HTTP methods to retrieve the create,
read, update and delete (CRUD) functionality.
• Statelessness Furthermore, REST builds on the statelessness principle. This means
that every transaction between client and server is independent and unrelated to pre-
vious transactions between client and server. The server does not store any state in-
formation of the client. When the client needs to have a state, it is self-responsible to
keep track of it.
• Cache The cache design principle is applied to REST to improve network efficiency.
The cache design principle requires that the data within the response is implicitly
or explicitly labelled as cacheable or non-cacheable. When a response is cacheable,
the server granted the client the right to reuse that response data for later, equivalent
requests[13]. This takes away the latency between the client’s request and the server’s
response.
• Layered System The layered system design patterns allow architecture to be com-
posed of hierarchical layers. Each component’s behaviour could have a constraint
that limits its range. Bounds can be added around each layer which is also beneficial
for security. The disadvantage is that a layered system adds overhead and latency to
the data processing [13].
• Code-On-Demand Code-On-Demand is the last design principle. This principle is
optional since it reduces the extensibility of the REST service. Code-On-Demand en-
ables web servers to transfer executable programs to clients temporarily [13].
Description Specification Many techniques are available to document the specification
of a REST web services with its endpoints and resources to readers. Examples of techniques
are OpenAPI 2, JSON Schema 3, RAML 4 and WSDL 5. These specifications contain infor-
mation about Uniform resource identifiers (URIs) and other resources, endpoints, HTTP
methods supported by the endpoints, the expected input models, and the expected HTTP
response codes and response model. From all these techniques, the OpenAPI technique
for documenting REST web services is the most popular option.
The description specification is most often good and easy to read for readers. However,
these readers are not only human but also and mainly computers. When the specification is






For example, the OpenAPI scheme is machine-readable, and tooling like Swagger 6 can
process it.
2.2. FUZZING
Fuzzing is an effective and widely used technique for finding vulnerabilities in software [11].
Using this technique could help to discover a vulnerability before an attacker does and per-
haps exploits the vulnerability. Where developers and system engineers can use fuzzers to
act defensive, attackers can use the same kind of fuzzers to act offensive. During fuzzing,
the fuzzer runs a SUT. The fuzzer will use an input generation strategy to send inputs to this
SUT. These inputs could be valid or invalid. When they are invalid, they are syntactically or
semantically incorrect. In those cases, the SUT will most likely deny them. The fuzzer mon-
itors the behaviour and response of the SUT when the created input is processed. While the
fuzzer monitors the SUT, vulnerabilities can occur, and the fuzzer logs them. Many compa-
nies such as Microsoft [3] and Google [2] [1] have integrated fuzzing within their software
development lifecycle. Security auditors and open-source developers have followed this
trend, and both have started to use fuzzing to provide and assure end-users with secure
software[26].
Initially, Professor Miller started with fuzzing [28]. Miller wanted to test the robustness
of various UNIX utilities 7, given an unpredictable input. During the research, Miller cre-
ated an input generator to create a stream of random characters and used these inputs to
attack as many utilities as possible. Within the performed experiments, 25-33% of the util-
ity programs on any UNIX versions that Miller tested did crash[28].
TERMINOLOGY
The fuzzing terminology is introduced based on the article from Chen et al. [11]. This re-
search introduces this terminology because the fuzzing community is vibrant. The number
of fuzz testing related articles is rapidly increasing, as displayed in figure 2.2, which dis-
plays new (IEEE 8) fuzz testing related articles for each year between 1989 and 2020. Differ-
ent terms describe the same technique or a similar term for different techniques between
those articles. For example, various terms define the target program, e.g. System Under
Test (SUT), Program Under Test (PUT), Unit Under Test (UUT). Within this research, only
SUT is the used synonym for the target program.
For this reason, this research selects one standard. This standard is based on the defini-
tions mentioned by Chen et al. [11]. This research describes some of the definitions below.
This research uses this standard throughout this thesis.
Fuzzing Fuzzing is a highly effective vulnerability detection technique. It tests a system
with the continuous processing of test cases generated by another program. At the same
time, the fuzzer monitors the SUT to expose any defects revealed by processing this in-
put [11].
Fuzz testing Fuzz testing is the use of fuzzing to test a SUT [26]. The goal is to see if the





Figure 2.2: Results of fuzz testing articles from IEEE Xplore
testing is mainly used to find security vulnerabilities [11].
Fuzzer A fuzzer is a program that performs fuzz testing on the SUT [26]. The fuzzer con-
sists of different modules to handle different tasks[11]. A fuzzer makes fuzzing possible on
SUTs.
ANATOMY OF A FUZZING SYSTEM
The original structure of the early fuzzing systems is quite simple. The blue dashed frame
in figure 2.3 shows an example of a fuzzing system. The system contains five modules: the
test case generator, the delivery module, the target program, the bug detector and the bug
filter. The black arrows visualise the data flow between the modules that transfer data, e.g.,
the test case generator transfers the test cases to the delivery module, and the bug detector
transfers bugs to the bug filter. Within the same figure, red arrows visualise the relation
between modules that control each other, e.g., the monitor monitors the target program
and the static analyzer to provide runtime and static information [11].
The test case generator creates an input for the SUT; this input represents one test case.
The generator can use different strategies for input generation to improve the efficiency of
fuzzing. One of the strategies that the fuzzer can use is random mutating. In this case, the
initial input seed is getting mutated for each test case.
The delivery module receives test cases from the test case generator and delivers them
to the target program for execution [11].
The target program is the system that is under test, also known as SUT. It can be all types
of systems, e.g., binary code (with or without source code), a web service, an operation
system, a compiler.
The bug detector collects and analyses relevant information when a target program
crashes and reports errors in a test case. The bug filter is usually done manually and, there-
fore, time-consuming. However, some tools have built a bug filter on top of the fuzzer.
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Figure 2.3: Fuzzing system architecture, adopted from Chen et al. [11]
Modifications
The early fuzzing system has been found inefficient for modern applications. Most mod-
ern applications have more complex input structures and are larger than the older Unix ap-
plications. Researchers have introduced different techniques to improve the efficiency of
fuzzers. The techniques include grammar representation [14], scheduling algorithms [9],
static analysis [22], dynamic symbolic execution [10], coverage guide/feedback [9], dy-
namic taint analysis [31], and machine learning [17]. The red dashed frame in figure 2.3
includes these techniques.
The monitor obtains runtime information, which the monitor sends to the test genera-
tor. The runtime information sent to the test generator includes the symbolic expressions,
coverage data, and dynamic taint analysis gathered from the added techniques.
The static analyser performs a static analysis. During this process, the static analyser
extracts static information from a binary program or source code to find potential bugs
and direct the fuzzing process [8]. The static information includes control flows, potentially
vulnerable code, and specified patterns.
While the fuzzing process takes place, the fuzzer performs the dynamic analysis. During
this process, the fuzzer updates the test case generator with feedback received from the
SUT. This makes it possible for the test case generator to generate better inputs.
BASIC TAXONOMY OF FUZZER TYPES
Three types categorise a fuzzer: whitebox, blackbox and greybox fuzzing [11]. The most
significant difference between these groups is the amount of gathered information, e.g.
program understanding, about the SUT.
Blackbox fuzzer
When using a blackbox fuzzer, the fuzzer does not look at the logic inside of the SUT.
The fuzzer continuously provides input data and observes the output results from the SUT.
Black-box fuzzing is at one of the extremes in terms of the level of program understanding.
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Whitebox fuzzer
At the other extreme is whitebox fuzzing. In this case, the fuzzer can obtain detailed
information on the SUT. Whitebox fuzzing can obtain information on the SUT, e.g., source
code and design specifications. The fuzzing process utilises this information to improve
the efficiency of the fuzzing process. When the fuzzer knows that the program does not
respond to an input, it makes no sense in trying it again.
Greybox fuzzer
Between these two extremes lies greybox fuzzing. Greybox fuzzing obtains some infor-
mation about the SUT. However, it differs from whitebox fuzzing since greybox fuzzing is
not built on heavyweight analysis and constraint solving. Also, in some cases, the greybox
fuzzer can obtain the code coverage to reach deeper into the SUT. What is possible with a
fuzzer depends on the design of the fuzzer. For example, a greybox fuzzer like AFL9 lever-
ages the code coverage to reach deeper into the SUT. When the whitebox fuzzer requires
the user to provide much information, a greybox fuzzer potentially does not require all this
information. In those cases, a greybox fuzzer could be quicker to set up than a whitebox
fuzzer. On the other hand, a blackbox fuzzer does not need any information about the SUT.
This makes the greybox fuzzer potentially slower to set up than the blackbox fuzzer.
INPUT GENERATION STRATEGIES
According to the input generation strategy, fuzzing has two categories: mutation-based
and generation-based. The mutation-based approach uses a prepared input seed. The
fuzzer performs random transformations on this seed. For example, if the seed contains
the value ’fuzzing’, the transformations could look like ’fazzing’, ’fussing’ or ’flaspnn’. In
the generation-based approach, the fuzzer generates inputs using a formal, semi-formal or
informal input specification, e.g., a model, a block or a grammar [11]. When using a model
that can create a JSON object, the model knows which properties within the JSON object
are fuzzable. For example, for a JSON object with two properties, id (int) and name (string),
the fuzzer generates the inputs for those properties. Finally, the generated inputs from the
generation-based fuzzer could look like these: ’id’: 1, ’name’: ’fuzzing’, ’id’: 12, ’name’:
’model-based’ or ’id’: 123, ’name’: ’hello world’.
In the case of mutation-based fuzzing, the target program can reject the inputs early
during processing. This is possible when the input data varies too much from the format
expected by the target program. In the case of generation-based fuzzing, this problem is
relieved by the input data specification. Therefore, mutation-based fuzzing almost always
generates a lower code coverage than generation-based fuzzing. However, the creation of
the input data specification is often very time-consuming. Figure 2.4 compares the two
types of fuzzing approaches[24].
2.3. MODEL-BASED TESTING
Model-based testing has an advantage over mutation-based testing. The advantage of model-
based testing is that it uses its knowledge about the message structure to systematically
generate messages containing invalid data among valid data [34]. This makes it possible to
generate more valid requests that could target more components within the software. For
a mutation-based input, the chance to reveal a vulnerability is lower [34].
9https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of generation-based and mutation-based fuzzers adapted from Li et al. [26].
In model-based testing, the fuzzer generates test cases based on a model-based ap-
proach [34]. Within a model-based approach, the model represents a simple, abstract ver-
sion of the SUT. Model-based testing uses models from three groups: formal, semi-formal,
and informal models [30]. Formal models have a mathematical foundation. The use of for-
mal models is problematic because scaling requires many resources. For informal models,
the absence of a uniform definition makes it difficult to model the complexity of modern
applications. This results in that most of the models are semi-formal. These models can
not prove properties mathematically, but these models make it possible to allow structured,
automated testing of complex applications [15].
Since semi-formal models are the most common, this paragraph explains what a semi-
formal model should look like for REST web services. The semi-formal model should con-
tain three components: an interface description, a behavioural model, and deployment
information to perform automated model-based testing [20]. The interface description de-
scribes the available interfaces in a SUT. Furthermore, the interface description describes
the expected inputs and outputs. Based on this information, the fuzzer selects the target
locations with their expected inputs. These target locations are the available interfaces. For
REST web services, the target locations are the paths with their HTTP method (POST, GET,
PUT, and DELETE). The behavioural model contains information about how the SUT be-
haves. Most important for REST web services are the dependencies between endpoints and
the order in which these endpoints should be. The deployment information is the last part
of the model. The deployment information describes the deployment location of the SUT.
For REST web services, a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) to the location of the specifica-
tion would be sufficient. Other information can be obtained based on this specification,
e.g., the version, the host URL, and the HTTP method.
Model-based testing generates test cases based on the obtained model. Atlidakis et
al. [7] use the OpenAPI specification of a REST web service to create the model. The Ope-
nAPI specification contains the information for each endpoint. The model should extract
the available endpoints, inputs, and outputs from this specification. The dependencies be-
tween endpoints should be derived from the OpenAPI specification to complete the model.
2.4. MODEL-BASED WHITEBOX FUZZING
This research implements the model-based whitebox fuzzing technique. This subsection
will focus on how prior research executes the model-based whitebox fuzzing approach.
There are two approaches available for model-based whitebox fuzzing after searching
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model-based whitebox on Google scholar 10. Letichevsky et al. introduce a model-based
whitebox fuzzing approach based on symbolic execution [23]. This approach uses a formal
model and generates traces based on the source code of the SUT. Concrete tests for deter-
ministic systems testing result from checking the conformance between the actual outputs
in the traces and the expected outputs generated by the model. Furthermore, Pham et
al. introduce an approach for program binaries [32]. The second approach is described
in more detail, includes multiple interesting techniques (including symbolic execution) to
create the inputs and is more often referred to within fuzzing related papers. The remainder
of this subsection analyses the second approach.
Pham et al. introduce a model-based whitebox fuzzing (MoWF) approach [32], which
shows that this technique effectively finds security vulnerabilities within a SUT. With this
approach, model-based whitebox fuzzing is a marriage of model-based blackbox fuzzing
(MoBF) and traditional whitebox fuzzing (TWF). For model-based whitebox fuzzing, the
model-based blackbox fuzzing generates the valid input files. This is done efficiently with
the known objects within the model. The whitebox fuzzer processes the input files and
monitors how the fuzzer behaves during the fuzzing process.
Model-based whitebox fuzzing follows four steps while fuzzing: Seed selection and file
cracking, adding and removing data chunks, changing data fields in inserted data chunks,
repeat. The model-based whitebox fuzzer selects an initial input closest to a potential crash
location during seed selection and file cracking. The fuzzer uses static analysis from the In-
tel Dynamic Binary Instrumental Tool: Pin [25] to obtain potential crash locations. The
fuzzer then tests these potential crash locations to validate the analysis and check if this
leads to a vulnerability. The model-based whitebox fuzzer instantiates the input from the
input model provided by the model-based blackbox fuzzer. Then, the model-based white-
box fuzzer marks all data fields which the user has specified as "modifiable". Model-based
whitebox fuzzer considers only these marked data fields for fuzzing. After the fuzzer cre-
ates the input file, the fuzzer creates a pool of input fragments. This process is called file
cracking. Within this process, the fuzzer considers all other files as potential donor files;
these are files from which the fuzzer uses fragments to make a new whole. The fuzzer dis-
assembles the donor files and adds the file fragments to the pool of input fragments.
In the second step, adding and removing data chunks, fragments of data are added and
removed from the input. This is necessary because the SUT only executes some inputs if
a specific data chunk is absent or present within the input. In REST web services, these
data chunks could be authentication keys in the header or essential properties within the
request’s body, e.g., an id. Once model-based whitebox fuzzing identifies the type corre-
sponding to the data chunk being removed or added, the file stitcher coordinates the data
chunk transplantation. The data chunk transplantation is responsible for placing the cor-
rect values for the parameters within the input file. This process has two steps. First, the file
stitcher searches the fragment pool for candidate fragments. Finally, the file stitcher uses
the input model to transplant them into the appropriate locations in the input. The goal of
this step is to create a valid input file for the target location.
In the third step, the fuzzer modifies the data fields within the valid input file. A method
symbolic execution is used to get valid inputs for the data fields based on the model. At
this point, the difference with model-based blackbox fuzzing is made. Deep vulnerabilities
that require specific values are best exposed by a symbolic execution-based approach [32]
10https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=nl&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=model-based+whitebox&btnG=
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because when the fuzzer generates more valid inputs, the chance of hitting a deep vulnera-
bility is more significant. When the file is complete, the fuzzer performs checks to confirm
that the inputs are valid. If this is the case, the fuzzer sends the inputs to the target location
and are processed there. Once the input reaches the target location, the fuzzer monitors
the SUT and checks if a crash occurs.
In the last step, repeat, data chunks can be nested. Model-based whitebox fuzzing uses
these generated nested files as new seeds to continue the next iteration, starting from step
1. From the initial seeds and the new seeds, model-based whitebox fuzzing selects the
location closest to the previous location and performs the steps again to create new inputs.
Listing 2.1 shows the entire model-based whitebox fuzzing approach. Lines 1 until 7 are
performed with static analysis to discover the available targets and inputs. The previous
steps cover the lines from 8 until 24.
Listing 2.1: Model-based whitebox fuzzing algorithm from Pham et al. [32]
Input: Program P , Input Model M
Input: I n i t i a l Test Suite T , Targets L
Output: Augmented Test Suite T ’
1 : if L = ; then
2 : L ← IDENTIFYCRITICALLOCATIONS(P)
3 : end if
4 : if T = ; then
5 : t ← INSTANTIATEASVALIDINPUT(M)
6 : T ← { t }
7 : end if
8 : while timeout not exceeded do
9 : Target location l ← CHOOSETARGET(L)
10: Input f i l e t ← CHOOSEBEST(M)
11: Fragment Pool Φ ← FILECRACKER(T ,M)
12: Crucial IFS Λ ← DETECTCRUCIALIFS( t , l , P , M)
13: for all λ ∈ Λ do
14: Valid f i l e s Tλ ← FILESTITCHER(t , λ , Φ ,M)
15: for all tλ that negate λ do
16: Hybrid f i l e t ’ ’λ ← MARKSYMBOLICVARS(tλ ,M)
17: F i l e s F ← PATHEXPLORATION(t ’ ’λ , λ , l , L , P)
18: for all f ∈ F do
19: Valid f i l e f ’ ← FILEREPAIR (f ,M)





25: T ’ ← T
Pham et al. test this approach with an experiment [32]. The selected subjects are from
a pool of well-known program binaries of video players, document readers, music players,
and image editors within this experiment. In total, eight programs were chosen, includ-
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ing more well-known program binaries like Video Lan Client (VLC) 11 and Windows Media
Player (WMP) 12. The model-based blackbox fuzzer, Peach 13, enables the model-based
whitebox fuzzer to create the inputs. The traditional whitebox fuzzer, Hercules [33], a tra-
ditional whitebox fuzzer for program binaries, eventually performed the tests.
Eventually, the results show that the model-based whitebox fuzzer performed better
than the traditional whitebox fuzzer and the model-based blackbox fuzzer individually.
The different fuzzers are compared based on the discovered vulnerabilities in the tested
systems. Overall, blackbox fuzzing approaches have known limitations. For conditional
statements, the chance of being exercised could be slim. In addition, generation-based
testing usually provides a higher code coverage compared to mutation-based testing [16].
These could be explanations for the performance compared to the model-based blackbox








This thesis describes a research that builds on the studies of Gerritsen [15] and Pham et
al. [32] by applying the model-based whitebox fuzzing approach on REST web services.
This part of the thesis will cover the used research questions and research method.
3.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis is based on an existing model-based whitebox approach [32], which is validated
on program binaries. Besides this research, only one other study has been found that pro-
poses a different approach for model-based whitebox fuzzing. However, this approach only
used one technique that is also available within the approach from Pham et al. [32]. This
thesis aims to determine if a similar approach can be applied to REST web services. The
main research question of this thesis is: How can model-based whitebox fuzzing be ap-
plied to REST web services to detect vulnerabilities? The following sub-questions are for-
mulated to answer the question:
• RQ1: What types of vulnerabilities can be detected in REST web services with model-
based whitebox fuzz testing?
When it is clear which vulnerabilities often occur within REST web services, it is also
possible to investigate whether the chosen fuzzing technique can expose them within
a SUT.
• RQ2: How can the model-based whitebox fuzzing approach on program binaries
be applied to REST web services?
The goal is to use an existing model-based whitebox fuzzing approach for a proto-
type that targets REST web services. It is necessary to examine whether the existing
approaches cover this, or where deviations must occur and why deviations must be
made.
• RQ3: How does model-based whitebox fuzzing perform on REST web services com-
pared to traditional whitebox fuzzing and model-based blackbox fuzzing?
The approach for model-based whitebox fuzzing should be tested against other fuzzing
techniques. In this research, model-based blackbox fuzzing and traditional whitebox
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fuzzing are used to compare the effectiveness of the different fuzzing approaches. Ex-
periments must be carried out to assess whether the model-based whitebox fuzzing
approach is more effective for REST web services.
3.2. RESEARCH METHOD
For the chosen research method, empirical research, a hypothesis can be created. The hy-
pothesis is that a similar approach as used for model-based whitebox fuzzing on program
binaries [32] also works on REST web services. Furthermore, better results are expected
from model-based whitebox fuzzing on REST web services than from a traditional white-
box fuzzer or model-based blackbox fuzzing on REST web services. With a valid hypothesis,
the main research question can be answered. A prototype is created that is capable of per-
forming model-based whitebox fuzzing to support this research. Additionally, this research
uses quantitative research by using multiple experiments to get more results for the com-
parison.
The research starts with a few studies in the following areas:
• Vulnerabilities in REST web services - This study covers RQ1. Based on the liter-
ature, this study finds the common vulnerabilities in REST web services. With the
knowledge of REST web services and model-based whitebox fuzzing, discoverable
vulnerabilities are selected.
• Model-based whitebox fuzzing approach - This study covers RQ2. This provides a
better understanding of the existing model-based whitebox fuzzing approach. This
research extends an existing model-based whitebox fuzzing approach with changes
for fuzzing REST web services.
• Metrics to compare fuzzing methods - This study starts with RQ3. To eventually
compare the different fuzzers, it is important to know which metrics should be mea-
sured. This study selects the usable metrics.
The results of the study lead to the implementation of a model-based whitebox fuzzer
prototype. During the implementation, the fuzzer will automatically generate the model
of the REST web service from the OpenAPI Specification (OAS)1. Previously, this specifica-
tion was called the Swagger specification[7]. Based on this model, it is possible to target
each input location of the SUT. The fuzzer has the potential to trigger vulnerabilities at
these input locations. This model-based whitebox fuzzer is tested and validated against at
least one system under test (SUT), but the aim is to use multiple SUTs. This would pro-
vide more data to make a better comparison between the fuzzers. This research compares
the model-based whitebox fuzzer with a model-based blackbox fuzzer and a traditional
whitebox fuzzer to determine the effectiveness of the model-based whitebox fuzzer. The
comparison is made based on the metrics specified in the next chapter.
This research utilises publicly available SUTs. These SUTs are open source projects with
REST web services. These projects are selected because they are open source, this means




During the design, implementation, and validation phases, the prototype is tested against
a testing SUT. Additionally, during the experiments, several SUTs are used. Section 3.3.1 de-
scribes the test SUT with known vulnerabilities. Section 3.3.2 covers the SUTs that are used
during the experiments when the prototype has been completed. Section 3.3.3 describes
the model-based blackbox fuzzer. This part includes the model-based blackbox fuzzer. The
following section, section 3.3.4, describes the traditional whitebox fuzzer. Section 3.3.5 de-
scribes how combining both the fuzzers results in the model-based whitebox fuzzer.
3.3.1. TESTING APPLICATION
The testing SUT used during the design, implementation and validation phases of this pro-
totype is called SutSqlI. SutSqlI is created by Arjan Gerritsen[15] and contains some SQL in-
jection vulnerabilities. Within this SUT, no PreparedStatements were used to interact with
the database. This flaw leads to a risk of SQL injection since PreparedStatements makes
sure that unsafe characters are escaped. This SUT is a Spring Boot application written in
Java and built on Maven. The application is extended with Swagger to make it possible to
use the REST endpoints of the application. The SUT has four endpoints, as illustrated in
Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: SutSqlI endpoints
Currently, SutSqlI is only built to detect SQL injections. Listing 3.1 displays the original
source code of the endpoints. The implementation of the endpoints does not use Prepared-
Statements. The result of this is that unsafe payloads, e.g., "’", ";" and others 2, can escape
the SQL query and perform malicious actions. For now, SutSqlI only contains SQL injec-
tions. A SQL injection with an unsafe payload could damage the SutSqlI system, e.g., delete
the table or delete the database. However, SutSqlI has the potential to be extended and
include multiple vulnerabilities.
Listing 3.1: SutSqlI REST endpoints implementation
@Service
public class CommentService {
/ / variable ( s )
@Autowired
private JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate ;
2https://github.com/payloadbox/sql-injection-payload-list
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public Comment create (Comment comment) {
jdbcTemplate . execute ( "INSERT INTO comments ( description )
values ( ’ "+ comment. getDescription ( ) +" ’ ) ; " ) ;
Long id = jdbcTemplate . queryForObject ( "SELECT LAST_INSERT_ID ( )
; " , Long . class ) ;
comment. setId ( id ) ;
return comment;
}
public Comment read ( Long id ) {
Comment comment = jdbcTemplate . queryForObject ( "SELECT * FROM
COMMENT WHERE ID = " + id + " ; " , Comment. class ) ;
return comment;
}
public Comment update (Comment comment) {
jdbcTemplate . execute ( "UPDATE comments SET description = ’ "+
comment. getDescription ( ) +" ’ WHERE id = " + comment. getId ( )
+" ; " ) ;
return comment;
}
public void delete ( Long id ) {
jdbcTemplate . execute ( "DELETE FROM comments WHERE id = " + id +
" ; " ) ;
}
}
The original source code of SutSqlI contains a bug. For this reason, the function public
Comment read(Long id); is rewritten. Both the SQL query and the use of the queryForObject()
function are wrong. The SQL query selects data from "COMMENT", this table does not ex-
ist and should be "comments". The function returned an error (1 parameter expected, got
2). For this reason, the function is rewritten with the alternative query(). Applying both
changes resulted in a working version of SutSqlI.
3.3.2. EXPERIMENT APPLICATIONS
The research will utilise publicly available SUTs. These SUTs are open source projects with
REST web services. While exploring the Internet for fitting SUTs, the leading search query
was ’open source REST web applications’.
The following open source projects are obtained and could potentially function as a
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SUT: Magento Commerce3, WooCommerce4, Drupal5, PrestaShop6, MediaWiki7, and Sylius8.
These projects are selected because they are open source, this means that all source
code is available online for possible follow-up of this research. Additionally, these projects
are all built on PHP. Furthermore, when looking at vulnerability databases like the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) details 9, it is possible to see that these projects have a
history with discovered vulnerabilities in the past.
SUT 1: Magento Commerce Looking at the CVE details of Magento10, 30.7% of the vul-
nerabilities found are related to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Code Execution and SQL
Injection have 30.2% and 4.5% of the vulnerabilities, respectively. In total, the CVE
database contains 202 vulnerabilities until 2021 June 16th.
SUT 2: WooCommerce The CVE details of WooCommerce do not show much infor-
mation11. The CVE database contains only 5 XSS, 1 Cross-Site Request Forgery and 1
Directory Traversal vulnerabilities for WooCommerce from 2017 until 2021 June 16th.
SUT 3: Drupal For the Drupal project, the CVE database contains 320 vulnerabilities 12
until 2021 June 16th. From these 320 vulnerabilities, 36.6% of the vulnerabilities are
XSS related vulnerabilities.
SUT 4: PrestaShop PrestaShop has 58 discovered vulnerabilities in the CVE database
between 2008 and 2021 June 16th 13. Most of the vulnerabilities are XSS related vulner-
abilities (41.4%). The percentage of vulnerabilities related to Code Execution and SQL
Injection are 13.8% and 5.2%, respectively.
SUT 5: MediaWiki For MediaWiki, 245 reported vulnerabilities are visible between 2004
and 2021 June 16th 14. Of all vulnerabilities, 38.0% are XSS related vulnerabilities, and
17.1% come from gaining information vulnerabilities.
SUT 6: Sylius For Sylius, the CVE database has only reported three vulnerabilities15 un-
til 2021 June 16th. The vulnerabilities cover two categories: 2x an XSS vulnerability and

















A Virtual Machine (VM) executes the experiments during this research. A VM is to cre-
ate systems that have the same specifications to run multiple experiments simultaneously.
Important here is to make sure that all experiments have the same resources to compare
them. This VM has the following specifications and tools installed:
• Operating System: Windows 10 (64-bit) Development Build 2104 Enterprise
• Base Memory: 8192 MB
• Processor(s): 5 CPUs
• Execution Cap: 100
• Video Memory: 128
• Installed tools:




– Visual Code 1.55.2
– PHP 7.4.19 with:
¦ Zend OPCache 7.4.19
¦ Xdebug 2.9.7.1
3.3.3. MODEL-BASED BLACKBOX FUZZING
The model-based fuzzer rest-fuzzer[15] implements the model-based blackbox fuzzer. This
fuzzer uses the application programming interface (API) specification to generate a model.
Based on this model, the fuzzer generates the entries and inputs. Rest-fuzzer uses princi-
ples based on principles from RESTler[7] for the fuzzer. For example, using the OpenAPI
specification to generate the model comes from RESTler.
Rest-fuzzer checks for various bugs. With rest-fuzzer, when the fuzzer receives a re-
sponse with status code 500 (Internal Server Error), a bug is reported. These log files should
be monitored to find the exact issue for this bug.
With rest-fuzzer, it is possible to keep track of the code coverage, the number of exe-
cuted tests, HTTP status codes, and the number of discovered vulnerabilities. The reporter
generates reports with the code coverage; the fuzzer uses no coverage feedback during the
fuzzing process.
Fuzzing phases The model-based blackbox fuzzer based on rest-fuzzer has two phases.
The phases are the initialisation phase and the fuzzing phase.
In the first phase, initialisation, the fuzzer calculates the start- and end times for the
fuzzer. Also, the fuzzer loads the potential actions on the SUT to the model. After this
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phase, the fuzzer knows what actions to target on the SUT and when the fuzzer should
stop.
In the second phase, fuzzing, the fuzzer gets the action from the available actions and
executes that action with a value from the model. This process continues until the end time
exceeds.
Code coverage Measuring code coverage is possible by running Xdebug as a debugger.
Xdebug should be attached to the SUT, and the SUT should be modified to call the coverage
functions. This is potentially impossible when a SUT uses an external module to handle the
REST web services. In this case, it is not possible to measure the code coverage.
Xdebug gives detailed information on the included PHP files during a request and the
executed lines in these files. This precision led to the decision to create the rest-fuzzer code
coverage reports based on Xdebug logs.
When Xdebug monitors the code coverage, rest-fuzzer has a built-in reporter tool to
convert the Xdebug log files into a LATEX figure. This makes it possible to see the actual
results easily and makes it possible to compare this fuzzer.
Responses Rest-fuzzer stores every request and response. This makes it possible to cre-
ate a figure that provides a good view of what happened during the fuzzing process. Also,
manually reviewing these responses to find potentially triggered vulnerabilities is possible.
3.3.4. TRADITIONAL WHITEBOX FUZZING
For this research, the fuzzing tool PHP Vulnerability Hunter is chosen16 as the traditional
whitebox fuzzer. PHP Vulnerability Hunter is a whitebox fuzz testing tool to fuzz PHP web
applications. This tool can fuzz test REST web services that have a PHP implementation.
PHP Vulnerability Hunter is capable of detecting a wide range of vulnerability types based
on the source code. In addition, PHP vulnerability Hunter has some built-in scan plug-
ins that each scan for a single vulnerability like SQL injection. Besides PHP Vulnerabil-
ity Hunter, no other traditional whitebox fuzzer found when searching for an open-source
whitebox fuzzing tool that worked with the SUTs developed with PHP.
With a combination of static and dynamic analysis, PHP Vulnerability Hunter maps the
target application based on the source code. This technique makes it possible to find en-
tries and inputs.
As already mentioned, PHP Vulnerability Hunter can detect a wide range of vulnerabil-
ity types. The list below provides an overview of the available vulnerability types:
• Arbitrary command execution
• Arbitrary file read/write/change/rename/delete
• Local file inclusion




• User-controlled function invocation
• User-controlled class instantiation
• Cross-site scripting (XSS)
• Open redirect
• Full path disclosure
Fuzzing phases PHP Vulnerability Hunter executes the fuzzing process in three phases.
The phases within PHP Vulnerability Hunter are the initialisation phase, the scan phase
and the uninitialisation phase.
During the first phase, the initialisation phase, the source code is analysed with static
analysis to discover interesting entries (function calls) and inputs. Also, backup files are
initialised based on the current state of the application. Then, in the standard files, the
fuzzer adds annotations used for measuring the code coverage. When an annotation action
happens, this triggers a log event. After this phase, the fuzzer knows what to target and what
input is necessary to fuzz the function.
The second phase, the scan phase, detects the bugs and vulnerabilities within the SUT.
The fuzzer does this by scanning every file within the SUT using the integrated scan plu-
gins. During each request, the fuzzer uses dynamic analysis to discover new inputs and
vulnerabilities.
The last phase, unitialisation, is started when the scan phase is complete. Then, all
original application files are restored based on the backups made in the initialisation phase.
This means that the fuzzer removes all annotations from the files. Additionally, manually
deleting the log file is recommended. This saves much space on the system. During the
fuzzing process, log files of 1 GB are obtainable. After this phase, the application should
function as it did before starting the PHP Vulnerability Hunter.
Code Coverage The fuzzer measures code coverage on the function level or the code
block level. The code coverage during the fuzzing process is filtered for each scan plu-
gin. This makes it possible to see how much of the source code is reached by each scanning
plugin (e.g., a SQL injection scanning plugin). Measuring code coverage on the code block
level is slower but is more accurate. The prototype uses this more accurate option to get
more accurate results.
3.3.5. MODEL-BASED WHITEBOX FUZZING
With both the model-based blackbox fuzzer and the traditional whitebox fuzzer confirmed,
the used techniques can be combined to create the model-based whitebox fuzzer. In this
case, the model-based whitebox fuzzer extends the model-based blackbox fuzzer with tech-
niques from the whitebox fuzzer to gain more information about the SUT. Section 5.1 de-
scribes how the model-based whitebox fuzzing prototype works.
Finally, the model-based whitebox fuzzer is compared with the model-based blackbox
fuzzer and the traditional whitebox fuzzer. This comparison is important to conclude if
the hypothesis is correct and a similar model-based whitebox fuzzing approach as the ap-





This chapter covers research performed during the research period. The covered topics are
the topics described in the previous chapter: vulnerabilities in REST web services, model-
based whitebox fuzzing and metrics to compare fuzzing methods. This chapter answers
research question 1 and provides extra information for research question 3.
4.1. VULNERABILITIES
It is necessary to consider areas where an attacker could exploit a vulnerability to secure a
REST web service. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Foundation pro-
vides best practices for making a REST web service secure. The remaining part of this sec-
tion discusses vulnerabilities affecting REST web services. In addition, each subsection
notes if a vulnerability is fuzzable or non-fuzzable. The sources used for this overview are
OWASP API Security Top 10 Cheat Sheet [4], OWASP REST Security Cheat Sheet[27], Post-
man Top 5 API Security Best Practices for 2021[19].
4.1.1. HTTPS
Secure REST web services should provide only HTTPS endpoints. When unsecured HTTP
endpoints are used, the authentication credentials, e.g., passwords and API keys, are not
protected during transit. Also, integrity can not be guaranteed, and the service is not au-
thenticated because the client does not allow it.
This vulnerability is detectable in the OpenAPI specification of the SUT. Within the
specification, not all servers will have an URL that starts with https://. In those cases, the
fuzzer should mark it as a vulnerability.
This vulnerability is fuzzable for the model-based fuzzers. Both model-based fuzzers
will use the OpenAPI specification. In this specification, it is documented if HTTP or HTTPS
is used. For the traditional whitebox fuzzer, this data is not available during the execution
of the fuzzer. The traditional whitebox fuzzer does not have a scanning method for this
vulnerability. This is also not fuzzable when the fuzzer is done; the executed requests do
not specify the HTTP method (HTTP or HTTPS).
23
4.1.2. ACCESS CONTROL
Access control at each REST endpoint is a must for non-public REST web services. This
is necessary to avoid issues with the unauthorised use of REST endpoints that perform
changes on the database. OWASP suggests that each endpoint should be self-responsible
for access control to minimise latency, reduce coupling between services, and a centralised
Identity Provider should issue the access tokens [27].
Public REST web services without access control run the risk of being farmed, lead-
ing to excessive bills for bandwidth or compute cycles. User authentication mitigates this
risk [4]. User authentication, including API keys, is centralised in an Identity Provider (IdP),
the IdP issues access tokens [27]. With API keys, access can be given based on a valid API
key. This caller places the API key within the request header. Before the REST web service
processes the request, a check is done if the API key is valid or revoked. In addition, API
keys can reduce the impact of denial-of-service attacks since revoked keys will not start a
high-performance operation on the REST web service. Furthermore, based on the API key,
the HTTP status code 429, "Too Many Requests", can be returned when a client performs
more than accepted requests within a given time.
Besides API keys, web services could also use JSON Web Tokens (JWT) for authentica-
tion. JWTs are JSON data structures containing a set of claims that act as a signature [27].
The message authentication code (MAC) could be used to protect the integrity of the JWT.
One of the well-known consequences of broken access control is declined access, and
access privilege alteration, one of the most common attacks by attackers[19].
A REST web service endpoint should return a 401 "Unauthorised" HTTP status code
when the authentication token is missing. A request without an authentication token in
the header that leads to a 2XX status code has an access control vulnerability.
This vulnerability is fuzzable for the model-based fuzzers. It is possible to see the SUT
response when an API key is included in the request. However, there is nothing imple-
mented for the traditional whitebox fuzzer that makes it possible to analyse the access con-
trol vulnerabilities.
4.1.3. RESTRICT HTTP METHODS
When the client can request an unauthorised resource, unexpected behaviour could hap-
pen, such as inserting data in the database or, worse, deleting data in the database.
OWASP suggests creating a list of permitted HTTP methods, e.g. CREATE, GET, PUT,
and DELETE[4]. HTTP methods not listed should be rejected with HTTP Status Code 405;
Method not allowed. In addition, the client requesting the HTTP method should be autho-
rised to use the HTTP method on the database.
When an HTTP method on an endpoint is not specified, the endpoint should return a
405 HTTP status code. When this is not the case, then there is a vulnerability that a client
can perform a request to an unauthorised resource. The model-based fuzzers are using the
OpenAPI specification to create their models. Based on this model, it is impossible to call
an HTTP method not included within the model. The traditional whitebox fuzzer generates




Input validation issues are probably the most common issues found during the fuzzing pro-
cess. When not enough validations are implemented, an invalid input can cause crashes
within the REST web service or update/delete resources. These issues are linked to injec-
tion attacks, e.g., SQL, command and NoSQL [4]. Additionally, cross-site scripting (XSS) is
an attack resulting when the input validation is insufficient[19]. OWASP created the fol-
lowing rules to deal with input validation[27]. All rules limit the chance of a sound looking
invalid input.
• Do not trust the input parameters/objects.
• Validate input: length / range / format and type.
• Achieve an implicit input validation using strong types like numbers, booleans, dates,
times or fixed data ranges in API parameters.
• Constrain string inputs with regular expressions.
• Reject unexpected/illegal content.
• Use validation/sanitation libraries or frameworks in the specific language.
• Define an appropriate request size limit and reject requests exceeding the limit with
HTTP status code 413 Request Entity Too Large.
• Consider logging input validation failures. Assume that someone who is performing
hundreds of failed input validations per second is up to no good.
• Use a secure parser for parsing the incoming messages. If XML is used, use a parser
that is not vulnerable to XXE (XML External Entity) and similar attacks.
Different types of injection attacks can be performed. The fuzzer can detect this vulner-
ability by checking if an injection attack succeeds. Regular expressions should be able to
check if the request contains an injection attack. When a following dependent GET request
is performed, the response should contain an unharmful version of the injection input.
When this is not the case, an injection attack succeeded on the endpoint. Checking the
responses for injections is possible. This makes this vulnerability fuzzable for all fuzzer
types.
4.1.5. VALIDATE CONTENT TYPES
The body of a REST request and the body of a REST response should match the intended
content type in the header. Otherwise, this could cause misinterpretation at the client or
server-side and lead to code injection/execution[27].
Documenting all supported content types in the API specification is the solution for this
issue. In this case, requests with an unsupported content type or missing content type are
rejected and responded with the HTTP Status Codes 406 "Unacceptable" and 415 "Unsup-
ported Media Type".
Fuzzing with unexpected content types could potentially lead to some unexpected be-
haviour. REST web services most likely support various content types, e.g., application/j-
son and application/xml. The response should contain a 406 or 415 HTTP status code
25
when the request body or response does not match the header’s content type. If this is
not the case, an invalid content-type vulnerability could occur. Analysing the requests and
responses makes this vulnerability fuzzable for model-based fuzzers. The traditional white-
box fuzzer does not have the analysing tools to find this vulnerability.
4.1.6. MANAGEMENT ENDPOINTS
Management endpoints within REST web services are implemented endpoints not intended
for regular use. Their use is maintaining the application, and the users with access should
only call these endpoints. OWASP made some recommendations for the security of man-
agement endpoints[27].
• Avoid exposing management endpoints via the Internet.
• If management endpoints must be accessible via the Internet, users must use a strong
authentication mechanism, e.g. multi-factor.
• Expose management endpoints via different HTTP ports or hosts, preferably on a
different network interface card and restricted subnet.
• Restrict access to these endpoints by firewall rules or use of access control lists.
The API specification does not specify which endpoints are management endpoints.
This makes it not possible to find these endpoints and test them. The traditional whitebox
fuzzer can find the management endpoints. However, based on the source code, it is im-
possible to define the endpoints as management endpoints. This vulnerability will not be
considered for the model-based whitebox fuzzer and model-based blackbox fuzzer as it is
non-fuzzable. In those cases, having a specification would be helpful.
4.1.7. ERROR HANDLING
Sometimes, it is easier to program with good feedback. In those cases, it can be helpful to
return some details about what stack trace provided the crash. An attacker could use this
information to generate more targeted attacks. A best practice is not to reveal technical
information (e.g., call stacks or internal hints) of the failure unnecessarily to the client. For
REST web services, responses could reveal detailed information. Here the caller must know
what went wrong without exposing too much information, e.g., the connection strings [12]
to the database.
Good feedback, e.g., stack traces or internal hints, could help attackers. When an error
occurs, the response should not contain this information. This vulnerability is fuzzable by
checking the responses when an HTTP 5XX status code is returned. Regular expressions
could be used to search responses for detailed information. All fuzzers have the option to
scan the responses for error handling vulnerabilities.
4.1.8. AUDIT LOGS
REST web services use audit logs to store auditable events, such as logins, failed logins, and
high-value transactions [5]. Audit logs could contain sensitive information. A log injection
attack can provide an attacker with this information. In addition, an attacker could cover
his tracks by removing these audit logs. OWASP delivers some recommendations to make
the audit logs less sensitive [27].
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• Write audit logs before and after security-related events.
• Consider logging token validation errors to detect attacks.
• Take care of log injection attacks by sanitising log data beforehand.
The audit logs can be corrupted when an attacker is trying to add audit logs within its
requests. The fuzzer is not able to detect this vulnerability when no audit logs are used.
For the fuzzers, this vulnerability is marked as non-fuzzable. None of the fuzzers performs
analyses on the audit logs.
4.1.9. SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN HTTP REQUESTS
REST web services should prevent leaking credentials. Passwords, security tokens, and API
keys should not be visible in the URL [27]. The browser can store these requests, making
them readable for attackers [19].
To prevent sensitive information in HTTP requests, POST and PUT requests should
transfer sensitive data only in the request body or header. In this case, it is not stored di-
rectly. In a GET request, the URL should not add any critical information to the path. The
URL https://api.example.com/resource/123 is ok since it does not include sensitive data.
However, the URL https://api.example.com/resource/123?apiKey=abcdefghijklm is not ok,
since it consists of the API key.
The model should be checked to see if sensitive information is included in the path
parameters. With regular expressions, common sensitive words should be searched. Po-
tential words like key, password, and credit cards could contain sensitive information and
should not be included in the URL. This vulnerability is fuzzable by checking if the request
contains sensitive words in the path. The model-based fuzzers allow the user to analyse
this. By checking the input parameters, a static analysis could make it possible for the tradi-
tional whitebox fuzzer. However, this check is not implemented on the traditional whitebox
fuzzer.
4.1.10. EXCESSIVE DATA EXPOSURE
The REST web service could be exposing more data than is needed by the client. In this
case, the client is responsible for filtering the data. However, relying on the client is a vul-
nerability since this data could contain sensitive data which the client does not need[4].
The same applies to error handling and audit logs described prior. Preventing this vul-
nerability can be done by not letting the client filter the data. Furthermore, response checks
could be enforced to avoid accidental leaks of data.
This vulnerability is hard to detect without knowing the purpose of the response. If
sensitive information is not used, it should not be included. However, to define it as ex-
cessive data exposure, more information is necessary. Based on a path and input and out-
put parameters, it is impossible to say if the expected output contains too much data. For
this reason, this vulnerability will not be taken into account for the model-based fuzzers
(non-fuzzable). The traditional whitebox fuzzer contains no analysing functions for this
vulnerability.
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4.1.11. BROKEN FUNCTION-LEVEL AUTHORISATION
Attackers can replace the function name with another function name. This could trigger a
hidden API method that was potentially not documented. When no access control is imple-
mented, the attacker could obtain admin functions or admin data [4]. REST web services
most often call a different function when the path is modified. For example, when a request
tries to access the path GET /api/comments, a function tries to get the comments. When
an attacker replaces "comments" with "passwords" (GET /api/passwords), the attacker
tries to trigger a function that returns all passwords.
Denying access from user accounts to admin functions or restricting access by default
could prevent this vulnerability from happening.
The model-based whitebox fuzzer will use a model to generate tests. This makes it im-
possible for the fuzzer to detect this vulnerability because no function is targeted, which
is not documented within the specification. This vulnerability will not be considered for
the model-based whitebox fuzzer and model-based blackbox fuzzer (non-fuzzable). The
traditional fuzzer performs scans on the code and could find these functions. However, the
traditional whitebox fuzzer does not know which function is hidden.
4.1.12. LACK OF RESOURCES AND RATE-LIMITING
The REST web service is not protected against a large, excessive number of calls or payload
sizes. This vulnerability could lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack and other brute force
attacks, such as crack passwords[4] and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)[19].
Limiting payload sizes and defining proper request rates are two countermeasures to
prevent this vulnerability.
The HTTP status code 429, "Too Many Requests", is used to slow down clients from
sending large, excessive numbers of calls or payload sizes. If the REST web service never
responds with this HTTP status code, there are two options: the limit is not reached yet,
or the endpoint is vulnerable to this attack. This threshold should be set manually but is
not included in the fuzzer. This makes this vulnerability non-fuzzable during this research.
Additionally, the environments will not have a rate limit making this vulnerability non-
fuzzable for the fuzzers. This choice makes it possible to have more requests within the
given time.
4.1.13. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION
Poor configuration of the REST web services could allow attackers to exploit them[4]. When
systems are unpatched, files and directories are unprotected, and unnecessary features are
enabled. Various steps can be taken to improve the security configuration to prevent these
vulnerabilities.
This vulnerability includes inadequate/not protected endpoints. This could happen
when, for example, CORS1 is enabled. The OpenAPI specification can be used to check if
CORS is enabled. However, it is only called a misconfiguration when it was not designed
to support this function. For a fuzzer, it is not possible to know if it was an accidental
misconfiguration of a design choice. This is why the vulnerability will not be taken into
account for the model-based whitebox fuzzer. Furthermore, this vulnerability is also not
supported by the model-based blackbox fuzzer and traditional whitebox fuzzer.
1https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS
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4.1.14. IMPROPER ASSETS MANAGEMENT
Attackers can sometimes find non-production versions of REST web services (for example,
beta, acceptance, and testing) that are not as well protected as the production version. As
a result, attackers could use these non-production versions to gain information and create
attacks[4].
Removing these non-production versions or adding proper security on these non-production
versions is the best option to counter its vulnerability.
This vulnerability can occur when a non-production version is available that could leak
information. In this case, this vulnerability will not be considered in this research because
the location of OpenAPI specification is configurable (non-fuzzable). The model-based
blackbox fuzzer and the traditional whitebox fuzzer do not fuzz this vulnerability. For the
model-based fuzzers, it would be more accessible to fuzz eventually; when an older version
of the OpenAPI specification of the API specification is available, this specification could
leak the endpoints hidden in the recent versions.
4.1.15. INSUFFICIENT LOGGING AND MONITORING
When there is a lack of proper logging, monitoring, and alerting, attacks and attackers go
unnoticed[4]. Setting up adequate logging, monitoring, and warning is the only option
to counter this vulnerability. For REST web services, monitoring users’ activity helps to
discover users trying to exploit the system. If the system logs the attacker’s information/API
key, the system could block the attacker from accessing resources by revoking the API key.
This vulnerability occurs when there is a lack of logging. Source code should be anal-
ysed to find if the endpoint logs the request. However, the model does not include this in-
formation. Due to this, this vulnerability will not be considered for the model-based white-
box fuzzer. This vulnerability is also non-fuzzable for the model-based blackbox fuzzer for
the same reason. The traditional whitebox fuzzer is the only fuzzer that scans the source
code. However, the chosen traditional whitebox fuzzer does not scan the source code for
this vulnerability.
4.1.16. SUMMARY
This summary contains a table showing the results of all vulnerability types. In addition,
for each vulnerability type, it is noted per type of fuzzer whether it is fuzzable.







HTTPS X X -
Access control X X -
Restrict HTTP methods - - -
Input validation/injection X X X
Validate content types X X -
Management endpoints - - -
Error handling X X X
Audit logs - - -
Sensitive information in HTTP requests X X -
Continued on next page
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Excessive data exposure - - -
Broken function-level authentication - - -
Lack of resources and rate-limiting - - -
Security misconfiguration - - -
Improper assets management - - -
Insufficient logging and monitoring - - -
4.2. METRICS
This research uses metrics to compare the different fuzzing methods. This part of the study
focuses on identifying valuable metrics. A performed literature study obtains information
about the metrics.
Nowadays, comparing fuzzing methods happens based on several metrics: the number
of discovered vulnerabilities [32], the number of executed tests [35], code coverage [7], and
the HTTP status codes [7]. The subsections below describe the different metrics.
4.2.1. NUMBER OF DISCOVERED VULNERABILITIES
The number of discovered vulnerabilities indicates how many vulnerabilities are found by
the fuzzer. This metric is useful when comparing different fuzzers with each other. When
vulnerabilities are found, it is easy to see which fuzzer could find them.
The problem with this issue is that fuzzing is a random process. This means that each
run will have different inputs, which will potentially lead to different results. This makes it
hard to derive conclusions based on this stand-alone metric. Also, when the fuzzer finds
no errors, this metric does not provide any information about the quality of the input data
generated or mutated [35].
4.2.2. NUMBER OF EXECUTED TESTS
The number of executed tests indicates how effective a fuzzer is. When the fuzzer cannot
generate inputs that the SUT accepts, the fuzzer will eventually execute more tests. Good
inputs will take longer to process since they enter the SUT on a deeper level or are less
frequently rejected in an early stage.
With the number of executed tests, the executor of the tests can measure the effective-
ness of a fuzzer. However, stand-alone, it is hard to derive a conclusion. The number of
executed tests can be influenced by the SUT or fuzzing method. Combining this metric
with other metrics could provide a more precise conclusion.
4.2.3. CODE COVERAGE
Code coverage indicates the percentage of the source code that is executed by the fuzzer,
assuming that higher code coverage is a result of a more effective fuzzer. The code cover-
age is measured by calculating the total number of instructions, basic blocks, and routines
executed in the SUT [35].
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However, code coverage does not consider the complexity of the executed code cover-
age of the SUT. This means that different functions can have the same number of lines of
code, but the complexity of different functions is not the same. Generally, increasing the
complexity leads to an increased chance of vulnerabilities[37].
4.2.4. HTTP STATUS CODES
When looking at the HTTP status codes, the number of valid requests can be determined.
For web services, there are five classes defined:
• 1XX informational
The request has been received, and the process is continuing.
• 2XX success
The request was successfully received, understood, and accepted by the server.
• 3XX redirection
Further action(s) needs to be taken to complete the request.
• 4XX client error
The request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled.
• 5XX server error
The server could not fulfil a (valid) request.
From these five classes, the 4XX and 5XX classes represent errors. When a response con-
tains a 4XX or a 5XX status code, the conclusion can be made that the request was not valid
for some reason. For example, when the response contains a 404 status code, the server
could not find the requested resource. The server errors are linked to the 5XX errors. For
example, when a 500 status code is found, the server caught an unexpected condition dur-
ing the execution that prevents the server from fulfilling the request. A 501 HTTP status
code appears when a REST service is not yet implemented. A 503 HTTP status code is re-
turned when the service is (temporarily) unavailable for processing the incoming request.
For the other three (1XX, 2XX, and 3XX) classes, when the response contains one of
those status code types, the conclusion can be made that the request was received and is
valid. The most common status codes are 200 (OK), 201 (Created), 202 (Accepted), and 204
(No content). These status codes will most likely occur when using the POST, GET, PUT,
and DELETE HTTP methods.
Measuring the HTTP status codes from responses from REST web services is possible.
Each response contains an HTTP status code. If the fuzzer monitors the HTTP status codes,
this can say something about the ability of a fuzzer to create valid inputs. Combining the
HTTP status codes with the number of executed tests can provide more insight into how
effective a fuzzer generates valid inputs. However, this mainly involves the input genera-
tion strategy. As mentioned, a generation-based approach most likely generates more valid
inputs than a mutation-based approach.
4.2.5. CONCLUSION
When looking at the previous subsections, the conclusion can be made that none of the
described metrics would provide enough information to create a conclusion. The best so-
lution would be to combine the different metrics.
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The number of discovered vulnerabilities, the number of executed tests and the HTTP
status codes provide an overview containing useful information. From this information, it
can be concluded how many tests were run, how many vulnerabilities were found, and how
effective was the fuzzer with generation inputs. Combining this with code coverage, which
gives insight into how many lines of code are executed, can lead to a set of metrics that can
be used.
Eventually, adding the total complexity and the executed complexity of the tested SUT
will provide a total overview.
• Number of discovered vulnerabilities - How many vulnerabilities were discovered
within the SUT?
• The number of executed tests - How many tests were executed within the time limit?
• Code coverage - Which percentage of the SUT is tested?
• Status code categorisation - How are the executed inputs processed, and what status
codes did they return?
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5
DEVELOPING A MODEL-BASED WHITEBOX
FUZZER PROTOTYPE
With the performed studies in the previous chapters about the usage, specifics, limitations,
vulnerabilities of REST web services, and the prior research, a design for the model-based
whitebox fuzzer can be created. The main goal of this fuzzer is to validate the model-based
whitebox fuzzing technique. This fuzzer will gather the necessary inputs for the required
parameters of a tested endpoint. The following sections will contain the design for a model-
based whitebox fuzzer.
Firstly, section 5.1 describes the algorithm for the model-based whitebox fuzzer. Sec-
ondly, section 5.2 describes the architecture of the prototype. Thirdly, section 5.3 covers
the implementation of the prototype. Fourthly, section 5.4 includes the validation of the
prototype. Finally, section 5.5 consists of the results from running the different fuzzing
techniques.
5.1. MODEL-BASED WHITEBOX FUZZING
The developed prototype will follow the algorithm described in listing 5.1. This listing con-
tains the model-based whitebox fuzzing algorithm from Pham et al.[32], see listing 2.1, with
some modifications to make it fit for REST web services.
5.1.1. FUZZING PHASES
The model-based whitebox fuzzer has two phases during the execution of the fuzzer. Then,
when the fuzzer completes, a third phase is available to convert the results into figures.
The fuzzer starts in the preparation phase. This phase is responsible for identifying the
available target locations (endpoints) and instantiating valid inputs, outputs, and depen-
dencies based on the OpenAPI specification. The fuzzer places this data within a semi-
formal model. When this completes, the fuzzer will have a complete model containing the
necessary information for the next phase.
When the preparation is complete, the fuzzer enters the fuzzing phase. During this
phase, the fuzzer will continuously loop through a sequence of actions. The sequence starts
by selecting the target location within the SUT. Based on the selected target location, the
fuzzer generates a valid input file. Next, the fuzzer performs some manipulations on the
input to fuzz different values. When the file is ready, the fuzzer sends it to the SUT. The SUT
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will process the input and generate a response. The fuzzer will monitor the execution of the
test on the SUT, and the obtained information is stored. The fuzzer stores the code coverage
details locally within a log file, and the response from the SUT is stored in a database. By
storing the response in the database, the model can include this response for new test cases.
When the fuzzing phase exceeds the timeout, the fuzzer will finish its last request and
end the process. The results are stored within the database and are available for analysis
at that point. The fuzzer has a third phase, reporting, making it possible to create helpful
figures based on the database values.
5.1.2. ALGORITHM
The developed algorithm covers the second phase of the fuzzing process, the fuzzing phase.
The algorithm is a modified version of the original model-based whitebox fuzzing approach
in listing 2.1. The following description provides a detailed description of algorithm 5.1.
Also, this subsection describes the modifications to the original algorithm.
The algorithm takes a Program P, an input Model M, test execution services T, and an
empty set of target locations L. From these inputs, the Program P is the SUT. The fuzzer
obtains the input Model M, uninstantiated test execution services T and the empty set of
target locations L after the preparation phase, when the fuzzer obtains the information
from the REST web service (OpenAPI) specification. The target locations L and information
for the test execution services T come from the input Model M. This can be seen in lines
1-7 of listing 5.1. The algorithm obtains the target locations from the model of the SUT,
including a list of dependencies on line 2. On line 5, the fuzzer initiates the test execution
services. The fuzzer initiates the test execution services by initiating the required services
for the fuzzing process. For example, the fuzzer obtains the dependencies between the
endpoints of the model. In addition, the fuzzer could set the authentication information if
provided.
Listing 5.1: Algorithm model-based whitebox fuzzing for REST web services
Input: Program P , Input Model M
Input: Test execution se rv ice s T , Targets L
Output: Test r e s u l t s T ’
1 : if L = ; then
2 : L ← IDENTIFYCRITICALLOCATIONS(P)
3 : end if
4 : if T = ; then
5 : t ← INSTANTIATEASVALIDINPUT(M)
6 : T ← { t }
7 : end if
8 : while timeout not exceeded do
9 : Target location l ← CHOOSETARGET(L)
10: Input f i l e t ← CHOOSEBEST(M)
11: Fragment Pool Φ ← FILECRACKER(T ,M)
12: Valid f i l e f ← FILESTITCHER(t , Φ ,M)
13: Valid f i l e f ’ ← FILEREPAIR (f ,M)
14: T ’ ← T ∪ f ’
15: end while
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The main loop of the model-based whitebox fuzzing algorithm is shown in lines 8-15.
While the timeout is not exceeded, model-based whitebox fuzzing chooses the next target
location l on line 9. Based on the model, the fuzzer selects a dependent endpoint of the
previously tested endpoint. A dependent endpoint is an endpoint that required data from
the original endpoint or an endpoint that accesses the same resource; more information
is available in section 5.2.3. Otherwise, when there are no more dependent endpoints, the
fuzzer selects the following endpoint from the set of available locations. It is important to
make the fuzzer stateful. This is important because a stateful fuzzer can choose better lo-
cations based on the data from previous requests. With these better locations, the chances
of valid requests are higher, meaning that the fuzzer could potentially reach deeper within
the SUT [32]. For this reason, the fuzzer creates sequences of dependent endpoints. The
fuzzer selects the target location l from these sequences of dependent endpoints.
On line 10, the fuzzer selects the input file t by looking at model M. This part is modified
because the best input file can be chosen based on the model while fuzzing REST web
services. This model contains the expected format for the endpoint. Model M also contains
the outputs from the previous requests, which are available for future requests. The file
cracker uses these files to construct a fragmented pool Φ on line 11. The fuzzer uses the
fragmented pool to get values for parameters for dependent endpoints.
The algorithm uses the file stitcher on line 12 to create a file that contains valid non-
fuzzable parameters. The fuzzer generates these non-fuzzable parameters based on the
fragmented pool Φ; this fragmented pool is empty at first but gets filled during the execu-
tion. The fuzzer generates other fuzzable parameters randomly based on their type.
After modifying the input l, the fuzzer uses file repair to build the input on line 13. When
the fuzzer creates a valid input, this input acts as a new test case. On line 14, the fuzzer
inserts the test case in the test execution services T. The test execution services T execute
the test case on the SUT and store the response T’.
5.2. ARCHITECTURE
The developed prototype is a Java web application. The used architecture for the fuzzer
builds on the architecture used for a model-based fuzzer, also known as rest-fuzzer[15].
This fuzzer has been proven efficient for model-based fuzzing when comparing it with
blackbox fuzzing and dictionary fuzzing. Therefore, the decision to build the model-based
whitebox fuzzer on top of rest-fuzzer is based on the results from that research. How-
ever, the fuzzing process will have a different implementation to function as a model-based
whitebox fuzzer.
5.2.1. HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN
The architecture of the prototype consists of two applications, the back-end and the front-
end. The back-end application is responsible for running the entire fuzzing process. The
front-end application is a GUI for users of this prototype. The browser visualises the data
and results for the user.
The three-layered architecture is the base for the architecture of the model-based white-
box fuzzer[15]. Two applications implement these three layers. The front-end application
realises the presentation layer, and the back-end application realises the domain and data
source layers. Figure 5.1 presents an overview of the modules within the different layers.
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Figure 5.1: An overview of the modules within the three layers from the prototype.
Within the domain layer, the back-end application implements the service layer. This
service layer controls the transactions and the security. The total domain layer consists
of the following modules: the service layer, the task executor, the REST model description
(RMD) extractor, the fuzzer, and the reporter.
The data source layer consists of a data layer. This layer is responsible for the communi-
cation between the application and the database. Hibernate 1 is a framework that manages
database activities. This results in that the data layer only contains models of the classes
necessary to communicate with the database and the application.
During the fuzzing process, the fuzzer will walk through multiple phases. In the prepa-
ration phase, the main goal of the fuzzer is to obtain the necessary information about the
REST web service and create a model. This is done by parsing the specification of the REST
web service. Section 5.2.2 describes how this process works. In this preparation phase, the
fuzzer infers the dependencies of the different endpoints in the REST web service. Inferring
dependencies is described in section 5.2.3. Combining the obtained information leads to
the model. The fuzzer can use this model for later input generation. Within the prepa-
ration phase, the fuzzer makes no requests to an endpoint but obtains information to set
up the test execution services. These steps complete lines 1-7 from the fuzzing algorithm
described in listing 5.1.
Within the next phase, the fuzzer will actually start creating and executing test cases.
This main phase is divided into several subphases. These subphases are scheduling, input
generation, configuration updating, and evaluation. In the scheduling phase, the fuzzer
determines the following target location in the SUT. The input generation phase generates
the input for the test case. The fuzzer is a generation-based fuzzer based on the model
1https://hibernate.org/
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inferred from the preparation phase. Model-based generation creates an input schema for
the endpoints.
After the execution of a test case, the evaluation and configuration updating phases
start. In the configuration updating phase, the model inferred from the preparation phase
is updated based on the outcome of the executed test case. Doing this provides a better
model for input generation because the newly obtained values are available as parameters.
Next, the evaluation phase checks the executed test and looks if the request returns an
HTTP 200 status code.
Figure 5.2 displays a simplified overview of the proposed process for the fuzzer module.
Figure 5.2: Proposed fuzzer module process
5.2.2. PARSING OPENAPI
The fuzzer parses the OpenAPI specification to create a model. The used model is a semi-
formal model because it makes it possible to allow structured, automated testing of com-
plex applications. A formal model would also be possible, but setting up the formal model
would take much time for complex applications because all paths must be included to
prove the properties mathematically. An informal model would make it difficult to model
the complexity of these complex applications [30]. Due to this, the semi-formal is the
most suitable option. The semi-formal model consists of the interface description, the
behavioural model and the deployment information to allow structured, automated test-
ing [20].
First, the model-based whitebox fuzzer obtains the interface description and the de-
ployment information of the model from the SUT for the input generation. In the model
of a REST web service, the interface description contains a list of the available endpoints,
input parameters and outputs for the endpoints. The deployment information consists of
the host name. The fuzzer derives both parts of the model from the OpenAPI specifica-
tion rather than from code [27]. The OpenAPI specification of REST web services contains
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information that is easy to understand for machines and humans. In addition, the imple-
mentations for endpoints are relatively short and access different systems.
As mentioned previously, the OpenAPI specification is one of the used techniques used
to define the specification. Within this research, the fuzzer uses the OpenAPI specification
to generate inputs. Listing 5.2 provides an example of the OpenAPI specification from the
SutSqlI project. This OpenAPI specification describes the web services for SutSqlI. The list-
ing describes a single path from the OpenAPI specification; in this case, "rest/comments".
The OpenAPI specification describes each HTTP method on a path and contains the input
parameters and potential return values.
Listing 5.2: OpenAPI Specification SutSqlI
" paths " : {
"/ r e s t /comments " : {
" get " : {
" tags " : [
"comment− c o n t r o l l e r "
] ,
"summary" : "read " ,
" operationId " : "readUsingGET " ,
"produces " : [
"*/*"
] ,
"parameters " : [
{
"name" : " id " ,
" in " : "path " ,
" description " : " id " ,
" required " : true ,
" type " : " integer " ,
" format " : " int64 "
}
] ,
" responses " : {
"200": {
" description " : "OK" ,
"schema " : {




" description " : "Unauthorized"
} ,
"403": {
" description " : "Forbidden"
} ,
"404": {





} , . . .
}
From this OpenAPI specification, the fuzzer obtains the necessary information for cre-
ating a model. The model will consist of specifications for each endpoint. The remainder
of this subsection describes the process of obtaining information from the specification.
The OpenAPI specification makes it simple, understandable and straightforward to pro-
cess the specification of an endpoint. Firstly, the endpoints should be saved. Each endpoint
with multiple HTTP methods will result in an endpoint for each HTTP method. So based
on listing 5.2, GET /rest/comments/{id} and DELETE /rest/comments/{id} will result
in two different endpoints. For each endpoint, the model stores the following values:
• The base URL for the endpoint
• The input schema for path parameter(s)
• The input schema for the request body
• The input schema for form data
• The input schema for query parameters
• The responses schema
• The list of parameters in the response
• The required property for the parameters
It is necessary to store these values for each endpoint for the next part of the fuzzing
process.
5.2.3. INFERRING DEPENDENCIES
The second step is inferring dependencies from the OpenAPI specification. By defining the
dependencies of an endpoint, the behavioural model is created. The first part of this step
is determining what should be considered a dependency of an endpoint.
A dependency is a value for a parameter required by the endpoint’s input schema. With
this in mind, for the REST web service, a dependency is data needed to make an API call.
Therefore, dependencies for an endpoint are obtainable from the responses of other end-
points described by the OpenAPI specification. For example, based on the OpenAPI speci-
fication in listing 5.2, GET /rest/comments/{id} requires an id. In this case, a dependent
endpoint would be an endpoint that returns a response containing a property with the
name "id".
Besides the dependencies gained from the responses of endpoints, there is another
method to gain dependencies. Other endpoints accessing the same resource are depen-
dencies of an endpoint as well. For example, based on the OpenAPI specification in list-
ing 5.2, a new endpoint DELETE /rest/comments/{id} would also access the same re-
source as GET /rest/comments/{id}. This would make those endpoints dependent on
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each other.
Together the following list shows the dependent endpoints of a target endpoint:
• Endpoints using at least one of the required parameters for the target endpoint in
their response schema.
• Endpoints having the same required parameters as the target endpoint.
Listing 5.2 displays an example for GET /rest/comments/{id} to give more insight on
the dependencies. By looking at the required parameters from the schema, the schema only
shows one required parameter named "id". None of the endpoints is returning a param-
eter named id. Based on the first point, there is no dependency for this endpoint. How-
ever, multiple other endpoints are accessing this resource. PUT /rest/comments/{id}
and DELETE /rest/comments/{id} access the same resource. Combining both results
provides a list of dependent endpoints. The list of dependent endpoints for
GET /rest/comments/{id} consists of PUT /rest/comments/{id} and
DELETE /rest/comments/{id}.
5.2.4. TEST CASE CREATION
Test case creation consists of multiple phases, including scheduling, input generation, and
configuration updates. During the scheduling phase, the fuzzer selects the configuration.
The input generation phase generates the inputs for the scheduled tests based on the JSON
values from the OpenAPI specification. After the execution of the test case, the fuzzer up-
dates the configurations for the next test case. This part will cover lines 8-15 of the fuzzing
algorithm in Listing 5.1.
Scheduling Based on the configuration information available for model-based whitebox
fuzzing the fuzzer chooses the following target location. The original model-based white-
box fuzzing approach uses the initial seed inputs T to generate an input for the critical
location l to generate inputs that could expose a vulnerability [32]. The critical locations
have to be identified, and a model-based search has to be applied to do this.
The proposed model-based whitebox fuzzing approach identifies the critical locations
by looking at the available endpoints. A critical location is an endpoint that may contain
or expose a vulnerability when exercised by an appropriate input. Critical locations are
defined by looking at locations with many dependencies.
Traditionally, model-based whitebox fuzzing uses multiple techniques to perform the
model-based search. Furthermore, model-based whitebox fuzzing uses a model-based
search to reduce the distance to l (target location). Since REST web services mainly con-
sist of single-function endpoints, it is most important to test the dependent endpoints.
However, for REST web services, looking at the dependencies can be enough. Endpoints
that are close to the same resource can be selected fast based on the OpenAPI specification
mentioned in section 5.2.2.
Input Generation The input generator will generate input just before the execution of the
test case. Doing this enables the input generator to generate an input based on the results
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and feedback from the previous test runs. The generated input consists of two parts: the
input schema and the input parameters.
Firstly, the schema of the desired input is generated based on the target location. This
is necessary to make the requests more dynamic. The fuzzer creates an input that con-
sists of a subset of all possible parameters. The previous outputs in the model are used as
donor files to create a fragmented pool for data transplantation. In the original model-
based whitebox fuzzing approach, this process is called file cracking[32]. For example,
GET /rest/comments/{id} has a query parameter id; this only returns the comment with
that matching id. Next, the fuzzer could test all possible combinations of these parameters.
Three types of input parameters are available during this process:
• Required fuzzable parameters are parameters defined as required in the OpenAPI
specification. When the input does not include this parameter, the API will reject the
API request from the client/fuzzer. The fuzzer generates this value based on the pool
of received values. The fuzzer generates these parameters randomly.
• Required non-fuzzable parameters are parameters defined as required in the Ope-
nAPI specification. A parameter is defined as non-fuzzable when a generated value
will most likely result in a 404 status code. An example is the id parameter of the
GET /rest/comments/{id} of the SutSqlI testing application. Without obtaining
the id from dependencies, the request most likely is rejected by the service.
• Optional fuzzable parameters are parameters defined as optional in the OpenAPI
specification. The fuzzer always generates the values assigned to these parameters
randomly, and these parameters are not required in an API request to the REST web
service.
Secondly, the input values need to be generated based on input data types from the
model. The fuzzer generates the inputs randomly based on the expected data type in the
model. In this step, the fuzzer uses data from the dependencies. If the parameter is marked
as required non-fuzzable, then a value from the responses of dependent endpoints is used
when available. In the original model-based whitebox fuzzing approach, this process is
called file stitching[32] since the input data is generated based on specifications from the
model.
While generating the input schema, there is a difference between the required fuzz-
able parameters and the required non-fuzzable parameters. Based only on the required
attribute in the OpenAPI specification, these groups can not be defined. This leaves two
options, manually adding this parameter to the specification for each endpoint or automat-
ing this process. However, the fuzzer is not aware of what is non-fuzzable. Therefore, the
fuzzer should mark parameters as non-fuzzable during run-time. By monitoring the 404
status codes in the responses, a score property can keep track of this. If a parameter results
in too many 404 status codes, the fuzzer should mark this parameter as non-fuzzable.
Finally, the fuzzer should reestablish the integrity of the file. This is a task for a file repair
tool[32]. The file repair tool validates that the generated input data is a valid object.
Configuration Updating When a test case completes, the fuzzer should monitor the re-
sults to update the model for a better input generation for the following test cases. In ad-
dition, the following data should be monitored for each request: the state, the status code,
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values from the output used as inputs for required non-fuzzable parameters for dependent
endpoints.
The fuzzer uses the monitored data to update the model. If a test case is a follow-up
test case for the previous test, or when the parameter is required non-fuzzable, the input
generator will use the value from the dependencies instead of randomly generating a value
with a chance of being rejected by the endpoint. As already mentioned in section 5.2.4, the
fuzzer only marks a parameter as required non-fuzzable when it results in too many 404
status codes. However, the same parameter will result in the expected 2XX status codes and
could also be marked as required fuzzable. To determine if a parameter is required non-
fuzzable or required fuzzable, a score keeps track of this. This score is a guideline for the
fuzzer when the percentage of 404 status codes is above this score. Then, the fuzzer should
mark it as a required non-fuzzable parameter, and the fuzzer should obtain the value from
the model. Within the configuration of the fuzzer, the following two attributes should be
configurable: the score and the minimum of performed tests with this parameter.
5.2.5. EXECUTION AND EVALUATION
Besides executing tests and storing the responses from the SUT, the fuzzer is also respon-
sible for updating the model (see section 5.2.4) and aborting sequences of dependent end-
points. The fuzzer aborts sequences when the previous test did not result within the HTTP
200 range. In this case, no information is available for the following requests. Without this
step, the fuzzer could generate a lot of invalid requests because the state information is
unavailable.
To evaluate the results of the fuzzer, a database containing the requests and responses is
available. Within this database, SQL queries can be used to return rows that may contain a
vulnerability. In addition, Xdebug creates log files during the execution of the fuzzer. These
are available for evaluating code coverage.
5.3. IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes the implementations of the phases within the prototype. Also, it
explains the made decisions during the different phases. This section explains the made
decisions in the preparation, fuzzing and reporting phases.
Instead of implementing a REST web service fuzzer from scratch, the decision is made
to extend the rest-fuzzer project from Arjan Gerritsen[15]. This fuzzer is built on Java and
is based on Restler[7], an open-source tool for fuzzing. This tool already consists of a back-
end and a front-end, saving developing time for setting those parts up from scratch.
This implementation is extending the rest-fuzzer with the option to perform model-
based whitebox fuzzing. This model-based whitebox fuzzer will contain a stateful testing
functionality to follow-up dependent endpoints from a test case. The existing fuzzer needs
to be made stateful to work with the dependent endpoints. The following sections explain
more about the changes made.
5.3.1. PREPARATION PHASE
When the fuzzer start, the fuzzer should set up its model. The fuzzer does this by identifying
the available target locations. The model-based blackbox fuzzer contains this logic.
The result of the model-based blackbox fuzzer preparation phase is a list of available
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target locations. It is essential to declare the dependencies of a target location to improve
the program understanding. This is the second step within the model-based whitebox
fuzzer initialisation phase. With this data available, the fuzzer creates a model. Further-
more, the start- and end times are declared based on the configured duration.
5.3.2. FUZZING PHASE
The fuzzer will go through the same steps at every fuzzing loop while the timeout does not
exceed. Based on the dependencies, the fuzzer creates a series of stateful sequences.
Now the fuzzer will loop through the created sequences. First, a target location is se-
lected, then the request is created. When this finishes, the fuzzer sends the request to the
SUT. Finally, the response from the SUT is stored, and a dependent target location is se-
lected when available.
When a sequence finishes, the following sequence starts until the timeout exceeds. The
prototype repeats the steps within the fuzzing phase when the timeout not exceeds. Even-
tually, when the timeout exceeds, the fuzzer can finish its last call. However, no new or
dependent requests are fired again at the SUT.
5.3.3. REPORTING
As mentioned in chapter 3.3, the model-based blackbox fuzzer uses Xdebug to measure the
code coverage. The model-based whitebox fuzzer uses Xdebug as well. Together with the
reports the rest-fuzzer creates, this provides the required metrics to compare the fuzzing
methods.
5.4. VALIDATION
It is important to test the prototype on a SUT that is easy to control and monitor to validate
the implementation of the prototype. As discussed in chapter 3, SutSqlI is the used SUT to
test the prototype. With this SUT, the validation of the prototype is done. This section will
validate the working of the prototype using the test SUT.
The validation of the prototype is done with the results of the experiments on the SUT.
This validation uses the testing environment with SutSqlI. This validation uses a model-
based blackbox fuzzer and a model-based whitebox fuzzer. This validation excludes the
traditional whitebox fuzzer because the SUT consists of a Java 2 back-end instead of a PHP 3
back-end. This makes it impossible for the chosen traditional whitebox fuzzer to fuzz the
SUT.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the HTTP status codes SutSqlI returned while executing the pro-
totype with model-based whitebox fuzzing. With these results, it is possible to see that all
requests (n=5486) which the fuzzer sent, within 60 seconds, to the SUT resulted in an HTTP
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Figure 5.3: SutSqlI Test Environment: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Responses
Figure 5.4 illustrates the HTTP status codes SutSqlI returned while executing the proto-
type with model-based blackbox fuzzing. With these results, it is possible to see that 51.01%
of all requests (n=7998) which the fuzzer sent, within 60 seconds, to the SUT resulted in an
HTTP 200 status code and are valid. The other 48.99% of the requests (n=7681) resulted in
an HTTP 404 status code and are invalid.
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Figure 5.4: SutSqlI Test Environment: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Responses
From these results, it is possible to see that the model-based whitebox fuzzer prototype
has a higher percentage of valid requests when comparing it to the model-based blackbox
fuzzer. This result is expected because the model-based whitebox fuzzer is stateful, and
the model-based blackbox fuzzer is not stateful. That the model-based whitebox fuzzer
is stateful helps the fuzzer with the test case generation. Based on the results of previ-
ous dependent requests, the fuzzer generates a new test case. This test case uses obtained
parameters to create the input for the request. Based on figure 3.1, an example can be
made. This example uses two endpoints, GET /rest/comments/{id} and its dependency
POST /rest/comments and the main focus here is to test GET /rest/comments/{id}.
The fuzzer uses the returned id from POST /rest/comments to get an existing object from
GET /rest/comments/{id} when using a stateful approach. Random values will be placed
for id when using a stateless approach. This results in many HTTP 404 status codes because
the provided id may not be attached to an existing object.
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Both fuzzers did not find a vulnerability during the execution of the test. However, since
the model-based whitebox fuzzer is stateful, more valid inputs can be generated. This could
help to find vulnerabilities within the SUTs faster.
5.5. RESULTS
This section elaborates on the results of the experiments. These results provide an answer
for RQ3. For the experiments, the SUTs WooCommerce and Drupal are selected. The other
described potential SUTs made it challenging to find an OpenAPI specification that was
also understandable for machines. Most of them only had a public specification that was
readable for humans. For example, Magento uses ReDoc4 to convert the specification into
a more user-friendly document. Only WooCommerce and Drupal were possible within the
given time limits. For WooCommerce, it was possible to measure the code coverage. How-
ever, the fuzzer does not measure the code coverage of Drupal. Drupal uses imported mod-
ules which made it hard to modify them to implement the Xdebug debugger within them.
5.5.1. MODEL-BASED BLACKBOX FUZZING
This section covers the testing results of the model-based blackbox fuzzer. With the model-
based blackbox fuzzer, several tests have been performed. Each SUT is tested three times
for 2 hours. Underneath, the paragraphs display the testing results for these tests. The re-
sults will cover the number of executed tests, the status code categorisation, code coverage
and the discovered vulnerabilities.
Requests The first metrics, the number of executed tests and the status code categorisa-
tion are obtainable from analysing the test results of the experiments. Below, figures 5.5,
5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 illustrate the model-based blackbox fuzzing runs on the two
SUTs.
When looking at the experiments on the first SUT, it is possible to see that the number
of valid requests is relatively low in the first three figures. The three executed experiments
produce in total 7446 requests. From these 7446 requests, only 176 (2.36%) of the requests
were valid; responses with HTTP status codes in the 200 range. This percentage is the ratio
of responses with status code 200 (n=176) to the total number of requests (n=7446).
The majority of the requests are invalid. In total, 7067 (94.91%) of the requests did pro-
duce a response with an HTTP status code in the 400 range. This percentage is the ratio
of responses with status code 404 (n=3644), 400 (n=2475), 401 (n=948) to the total number
of requests (n=7446). The remaining 203 (2.73%) requests did result in a response with an
HTTP status code in the 500 range. This percentage is the ratio of responses with status
code 501 (n=203) to the total number of requests (n=7446).
When looking at the experiments on the second SUT, it is possible to see that the num-
ber of valid requests is relatively low in the last three figures compared to the other sta-
tus codes. These three executed experiments produce in total 30518 requests. From these
30518 requests, 5635 (18.46%) of the requests were valid; responses with HTTP status codes
in the 200 range. This percentage is the ratio of responses with status code 200 (n=5635) to
the total number of requests (n=30518).
4https://github.com/Redocly/redoc
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The majority of the requests are invalid. However, 24883 (81.54%) of the requests did
produce a response with an HTTP status code in the 400 range. This percentage is the
ratio of responses with status code 404 (n=17355) and 415 (n=7528) to the total number of
requests (n=30518).
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Figure 5.5: WooCommerce: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Responses Run 1
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Figure 5.6: WooCommerce: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Responses Run 2
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Figure 5.7: WooCommerce: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Responses Run 3
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Figure 5.8: Drupal: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Responses Run 1
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Figure 5.9: Drupal: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Responses Run 2
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Figure 5.10: Drupal: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Responses Run 3
Code coverage The model-based blackbox fuzzer could not calculate the code coverage
for the REST web service in the Drupal project. As a result, only data from the REST web
service in the WooCommerce project could be gathered. Unfortunately, Drupal uses mod-
ules which makes it hard to modify them when setting up the SUT. For this reason, the
fuzzer does not track the code coverage for Drupal. Figures 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 illustrate
the code coverage for the WooCommerce project.
From the results, it is possible to see that the total executed lines of code initially go up
sharply and then stagnate at a certain point at the start. In Run 1, this happens after 1400
requests. In run 2 and run 3, this already happens after 800 requests. In all three cases, the
total number of executed lines is 789. This is 11.48% of the total lines of code (n = 6889).
Although the fuzzer executes 11.48% of all the source code, the SUT executes no endpoint
(n=0) entirely. This could happen when the input does not execute all paths within the
implementation of the endpoint.
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Figure 5.11: WooCommerce: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Coverage Run 1
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Figure 5.12: WooCommerce: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Coverage Run 2
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Figure 5.13: WooCommerce: Model-based blackbox fuzzing - Coverage Run 3
Vulnerabilities With model-based blackbox fuzzing, only one vulnerability is discovered
within the selected vulnerability types. The discovered vulnerability is the HTTPS vulner-
ability. This vulnerability disappears when installing an SSL certificate 5 on the server. In
this case, the SUT can use HTTPS, and the specification includes HTTPS in the schemes
array within the specification.
Furthermore, the fuzzer did not trigger another vulnerability from the other selected
vulnerability types:
• Access Control - The project configurations do not include credentials. As a result,
the WooCommerce SUT returns a lot of 401 status codes. For the Drupal SUT, the
fuzzer used the default credentials.
5https://www.ssl.com/
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• Injection - By scanning the responses for common injection inputs 6, none was dis-
covered, leading to a vulnerability within both SUTs.
• Validate content types - For both SUTs, this vulnerability did not occur. This was
checked by looking at the requests that had a 406 or 415 status code.
• Error handling - The SUTs do not include error handling vulnerabilities. None of the
responses with a 500 status code did include traces or good, useful feedback.
• Sensitive information in HTTP Requests - No sensitive information is added within
the path URL for both SUTs. When scanning the path variables, the query contained
words as ’password’, ’creditcard’, ’key’ and ’license’.
5.5.2. TRADITIONAL WHITEBOX FUZZING
This section covers the testing results of the traditional whitebox fuzzer. With the tradi-
tional whitebox fuzzer, several tests have been performed. Each SUT is tested three times
until completion. Below, the testing results are displayed for these tests. The results will
cover the number of executed tests, the status code categorization, code coverage and the
discovered vulnerabilities.
Requests The traditional whitebox fuzzer runs until completion. When the fuzzer fin-
ishes, all responses can be analysed in an individual file. The fuzzer executed 2074 tests for
the REST web service in the WooCommerce project. When merging the response files (.txt
- text documents) with the command prompt, with the command "copy *_Response.txt
combined.txt", the combined.txt file can be analyzed for the HTTP status codes. In total,
2074 tests are valid from the 2074 executed tests. All responses include the HTTP 200 status
code. Figure 5.14 visualises these results.
The traditional whitebox fuzzer performed 915 tests on the REST web service in the
Drupal project. The combined response file, generated using the same command, only
contains HTTP 403 status codes. None of the executed tests was a valid test for the REST
web service in the Drupal project. Figure 5.15 visualises this. The reason for this could be
that Drupal requires authorization. This is something the traditional whitebox fuzzer does
not include.
































Figure 5.14: WooCommerce: Tradition whitebox fuzzing - Responses
6https://github.com/payloadbox
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Figure 5.15: Drupal: Tradition whitebox fuzzing - Responses
Code coverage The traditional whitebox fuzzer could calculate the code coverage of the
REST web service in the WooCommerce project and the Drupal project.
From the results, it is possible to see that every scan plugin was executed on the same
lines of code. Every scan plugin reaches a code coverage of only 1.69% within the REST
web services from the WooCommerce project. Figure 5.16 illustrates this. This results in a
total of 118 executed lines of code, as shown in figure 5.17. For the REST web services in
the Drupal project, the fuzzer achieves a code coverage of 0%. This results in a total of 0
executed lines of code, as shown in figure 5.18. This is expected based on the responses.
All requests did return an HTTP 403 status code. This means that using the endpoint is
forbidden. Based on that result, the obtained code coverage of 0% is explainable because
the fuzzer did not trigger an endpoint to execute.
Figure 5.16: WooCommerce: Traditional whitebox fuzzing - Code coverage results
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Figure 5.17: WooCommmerce: Tradition whitebox fuzzing - Coverage




















Figure 5.18: Drupal: Tradition whitebox fuzzing - Coverage
Vulnerabilities During the experiments, the traditional whitebox fuzzer used all available
scan plugins. With these plugins, the traditional whitebox fuzzer discovered the same 58
vulnerabilities in the REST web service from WooCommerce. All these vulnerabilities are of
the Full Path Disclosure type. Within the responses, an error occurs since a file is not found.
Within the body of the response, the SUT exposes a full system path. Figure 5.19 contains
an example of one response. The figure is responding with an exception, and the error
message contains two times the system path C:\xampp\htdocs\wordpressWC\wp-inclu
des\rest-api\search\class-wp-rest-response.php. The CVE database does not list
this vulnerability, but this vulnerability has existing remediation. If in the php.ini file the
property "display_errors" is set to "off", this vulnerability should not occur anymore 7.
7https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerabilities/web/wordpress-full-path-disclosure/
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Figure 5.19: WooCommerce: Traditional whitebox fuzzing - Vulnerability results
Github8 hosts the documents containing the combined responses from the SUTs. Within
the responses, the vulnerabilities can be found.
5.5.3. MODEL-BASED WHITEBOX FUZZING
This section covers the testing results of the model-based whitebox fuzzer. With the model-
based whitebox fuzzer, several tests have been performed. Each SUT is tested three times
for 2 hours. Underneath, the paragraphs display the testing results for these tests. The re-
sults will cover the number of executed tests, the status code categorisation, code coverage
and the discovered vulnerabilities.
Requests The number of executed tests and the status code categorisation is derived
from analysing the test results of the executed experiments. Below, figures 5.20, 5.21, 5.22,
5.23, 5.24 and 5.25 illustrate the model-based whitebox fuzzing runs on the two SUTs.
When looking at the experiments on the first SUT, it is possible to see that the number
of valid requests is relatively high in the first three figures. The three executed experiments
8https://github.com/JasonKleuskens1/PhpVulnerabilityHunter-experiments
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produce in total 14343 requests. From these 14343 requests, 8010 (55.85%) of the requests
were valid; responses with HTTP status codes in the 200 range. This percentage is the ra-
tio of responses with status code 200 (n=6509) and status code 201 (n=1501) to the total
number of requests (n=14343).
The majority of the requests are valid. However, the remainder is invalid. In total, 6333
(44.15%) of the requests did produce a response with an HTTP status code in the 400 and
500 range. This percentage is the ratio of responses with status code 404 (n=2013) and
status code 400 (n=3164) to the total number of requests (n=14343). Thus, the 400 range
HTTP status codes cover 36.09% of the 44.14%. The remaining 1159 (8.06%) requests did
result in a response with an HTTP status code in the 500 range. This percentage is the ratio
of responses with status code 501 (n=1156) and status code 500 (n=3) to the total number
of requests (n=7446).
When looking at the experiments on the second SUT, it is possible to see that the num-
ber of valid requests is lower in the last three figures compared to the other status codes
than it was for the WooCommerce project. These three executed experiments produce in
total 30322 requests. From these 30322 requests, 9864 (32.53%) of the requests were valid;
responses with HTTP status codes in the 200 range. This percentage is the ratio of responses
with status code 200 (n=9864) to the total number of requests (n=30322).
The majority of the requests are invalid. In total, 20458 (67.47%) of the requests did
produce a response with an HTTP status code in the 400 range. This percentage is the ratio
of responses with status code 405 (n=12433), status code 404 (n=7596), and 415 (n=429) to
the total number of requests (n=30322).
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Figure 5.20: WooCommerce: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Responses Run 1
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Figure 5.21: WooCommerce: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Responses Run 2
0 617 1221 1819 2421 3025 3612 4220 4832 5451 6043 6631
time [seconds]




















































Figure 5.22: WooCommerce: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Responses Run 3
0 350 702 1048 1399 1749 2096 2474 2824 3186 3534 3910 4259 4610 4953 5327 5678 6054 6410 6765 7136
·104time [seconds]





































Figure 5.23: Drupal: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Responses Run 1
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Figure 5.24: Drupal: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Responses Run 2
0 352 698 1045 1391 1738 2078 2450 2795 3150 3494 3867 4215 4559 4898 5269 5619 5994 6348 6701 7071
·104time [seconds]





































Figure 5.25: Drupal: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Responses Run 3
Code coverage The model-based whitebox fuzzer could not calculate the code coverage
for the REST web service in the Drupal project; this was the same as for the model-based
blackbox fuzzer. As a result, only data from the REST web service in the WooCommerce
project could be gathered. This is explainable because the model-based whitebox fuzzer
extends the model-based blackbox fuzzer and uses the same techniques. Figures 5.26, 5.27,
and 5.28 illustrate the achieved code coverage for the WooCommerce SUT.
From the results, it is possible to see that the total executed lines of code initially go up
sharply and then stagnate at a certain point at the start. From the halfway point, the fuzzer
does not execute a new line of code in the SUT. In run 1, run 2 and run 3, this happens after
1800 requests. In all three cases, the total number of executed lines is 2339. This is 33.59% of
the total lines of code (n=6889). Although this number is relatively high, still no endpoint
(n=0) is executed entirely. This could happen when not all paths within an endpoint are
executed.
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Figure 5.26: WooCommerce: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Coverage Run 1
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Figure 5.27: WooCommerce: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Coverage Run 2
Vulnerabilities With model-based whitebox fuzzing, only one vulnerability is discovered
within the selected vulnerability types. The discovered vulnerability is the HTTPS vulner-
ability. The experiments are not executed on a server that was provided with an SSL cer-
tificate. However, this vulnerability has existing remediation. This vulnerability disappears
when installing an SSL certificate on the server. In this case, the SUT can use HTTPS, and
the specification includes HTTPS in the schemes array within the specification.
Furthermore, the fuzzer did not trigger another vulnerability from the other selected
vulnerability types:
• Access Control - The project configurations provide the credentials. The SUT autho-
rises the fuzzer based on these credentials.
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Figure 5.28: WooCommerce: Model-based whitebox fuzzing - Coverage Run 3
• Injection - By scanning the responses for common injection inputs 9, none was dis-
covered, leading to a vulnerability within both SUTs.
• Validate content types - For both SUTs, this vulnerability did not occur. This was
checked by looking at the requests that had a 406 or 415 status code.
• Error handling - The SUTs do not include error handling vulnerabilities. None of the
responses with a 500 status code did include traces or useful feedback.
• Sensitive information in HTTP Requests - No sensitive information is added within
the path URL for both SUTs. When scanning the path variables, words as ’password’,
’creditcard’, ’key’ and ’license’ were used.
5.5.4. SUMMARY
This section shows the results of the experiments in a table. This table helps to compare
the fuzzing methods based on the results from the used SUTs.
Table 5.1: Summary experimental results
Fuzzer SUT Vulnerabilities Executed tests Valid requests Code coverage
Model-based blackbox fuzzer WooCommerce 1 7446 2.36% 11.48%
Model-based blackbox fuzzer Drupal 1 30518 18.46% -
Traditional whitebox fuzzer WooCommerce 58 2074 100% 1.69%
Traditional whitebox fuzzer Drupal 0 915 0% 0.0%
Model-based whitebox fuzzer WooCommerce 1 14343 44.14% 33.59%




DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
This research focuses on how a model-based whitebox fuzzing approach can be applied
to REST web services to detect vulnerabilities. This research provides an answer to this
question by answering the three subquestions earlier mentioned in chapter 3.
• RQ1: What types of vulnerabilities can be detected in REST web services with model-
based whitebox fuzz testing?
• RQ2: How can the model-based whitebox fuzzing approach on program binaries be
applied to REST web services?
• RQ3: How does model-based whitebox fuzzing perform on REST web services com-
pared to traditional whitebox fuzzing and model-based blackbox fuzzing?
The remainder of this chapter provides the answers to these research questions. Fur-
thermore, it makes conclusions and provides directions for future work.
6.1. VULNERABILITIES IN REST WEB SERVICES
This research uses literature to get more insight into the known vulnerabilities for REST
web services. Section 4.1 provides a list of all vulnerabilities for REST web services. This
research also shows that the model-based whitebox fuzzer could detect a number of these
potential vulnerabilities. However, the fuzzer can not detect all vulnerabilities from this list
due to the made design decisions. From the vulnerabilities, the following vulnerabilities




• Validate content types
• Error handling
• Sensitive information in HTTP Requests.
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6.2. MODEL-BASED WHITEBOX FUZZING APPROACH
Chapter 5 provides information about how the model-based fuzzing approach can be used
on REST web services. The proposed approach removes some steps from the original model-
based whitebox fuzzing approach because these steps can be simplified with the obtained
model. This makes the approach less complex than the original. In addition, the fact that
the prototype uses the OpenAPI specification rather than the program binaries helps re-
duce the complexity for the most part.
During the scheduling phase, the fuzzer identifies the critical locations by looking at
the available endpoints. The original approach uses a model-based search to find available
endpoints close to the previously tested endpoint. However, it is enough to look at the
dependent endpoints to find the critical locations for fuzzing REST web services. These
dependent endpoints are the closest to the previously tested endpoint and are obtainable
from the OpenAPI specification of the SUT.
During the input generation phase, the fuzzer uses file cracking, file stitching, and file
repair in the initial model-based whitebox fuzzing approach. First, the fuzzer uses file
cracking to extract potential fragments from previous responses within the model that the
fuzzer could use to generate valid inputs. Then, based on the state of each parameter, file
stitching uses fragments to place values from the model on the matching locations within
the request. Finally, the fuzzer uses file repair to ensure that the generated input is a valid
object. The same approach would work for the prototype. First, the needed parameters are
selected. This followed by creating a new request to fire at the SUT.
The current approach removes some steps from the original model-based whitebox
fuzzing approach. Therefore, it is not possible to gain knowledge on the crucial ifs. Source
code is required to gain this knowledge, but the prototype will only use the OpenAPI spec-
ification during run time. Furthermore, each run can generate a single input because the
OpenAPI specification provides this for every endpoint.
The developed model-based whitebox fuzzing prototype can generate valid inputs for
the testing SUT SutSqlI. In total, 100% of the requests did result in an HTTP status code
in the 200 range. This is explainable because the fuzzer detects the sequences based on
the found dependencies between the endpoints. The fuzzer creates valid inputs for the de-
pendent endpoints with the obtained values within the responses. However, the developed
prototype did not discover the SQL injection vulnerability. This is explainable because no
input was generated that should trigger a SQL injection. The fuzzer can create inputs that
trigger SQL injection vulnerabilities, but for this to happen, the fuzzer has to create these
inputs by chance. Only for parameters with a string type, this can happen. These parame-
ters are most often fuzzable, and that means that the fuzzer generates a random string.
6.3. FUZZERS COMPARISON
This research obtains results from the executed experiments with the model-based white-
box, model-based blackbox, and traditional whitebox approaches. The results come from
experiments with the SUTs WooCommerce and Drupal.
Firstly, the fuzzers did not find a new vulnerability when performing the experiments;
the fuzzer only discovered known vulnerabilities with existing remediation. The reason for
this could be the large, well-developed SUTs used during this research. New projects could
contain vulnerabilities that are easier to fuzz than for these well-known SUTs.
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Secondly, the results with the model-based blackbox fuzzer show that the model-based
blackbox fuzzer was able to send valid requests to the SUTs. However, the number of valid
requests in the 200 range is low for both SUTs, respectively 2.36% and 18.46%. Most of
the time, the SUTs respond with an HTTP status code within the 400 range, often the 404
HTTP status code. This means that the server could not find the requested resources. In
addition, the fuzzer achieves a low code coverage percentage of 11.48% for WooCommerce,
and the fuzzer only detected one vulnerability. These results are explainable because the
fuzzer only generates values that fit the requested format. However, the fuzzer does not
look if the requested resource is available. This means that functions within the source
are potentially not fully executed when the requested resource is not available. This also
explains the results in figures 5.5 until 5.10. Every time a GET, PUT or DELETE request is
sent with a random identifier, the chances are that the SUT returns a 400 related HTTP
status code.
Thirdly, the results from the traditional whitebox fuzzer show that the traditional white-
box fuzzer only was able to perform valid requests on WooCommerce. In total, 100% of the
requests the fuzzer made were valid requests in the 200 range. However, the fuzzer could
not perform a valid request on Drupal. All requests had HTTP status codes in the 400 range.
Besides those results, the achieved code coverage is low for both SUTs, respectively 1.69%
and 0.0%. These results are explainable because the fuzzer does not contain any specific
information for the connection with the endpoints, e.g., API keys. The fuzzer obtains all
information that is available from the source code. In addition, the traditional whitebox
fuzzer was able to detect 58 vulnerabilities where a full system path was exposed.
Fourthly, the results from the model-based whitebox fuzzer show that the model-based
whitebox fuzzer was able to send valid requests to both SUTs. The number of valid requests
is low, but compared with the other fuzzers, 44.14% and 32.53% is relatively high. In addi-
tion, the results of the responses are not linear as with the model-based blackbox fuzzer.
Furthermore, the achieved code coverage is relatively high, with 33.59% for WooCommerce
compared to the other tested fuzzers. However, the number of discovered vulnerabilities
is 1. In this case, only the HTTPS vulnerability is discovered. The results from the model-
based whitebox are explainable. The proposed model-based whitebox fuzzer approach ex-
tends the model-based blackbox fuzzer with the option to keep to be stateful to access
deeper parts of the SUT. This results in that dependent endpoints use the obtained re-
sponse from older requests to create a valid request that access deeper parts of the SUT.
This explains why the results are not linear and also makes it possible to find the vulner-
abilities within the deeper parts of the SUT. However, with the executed experiments, the
number of discovered vulnerabilities did not increase.
Fifthly, in the study of Gerritsen [15], the model-based dictionary fuzzer is compared
with the research of Takanen et al. [36] to define if the fuzzer can be named capable of de-
tecting vulnerabilities. Based on the data from this research, the fuzzers achieve a code
coverage between 20% and 42%, and their efficiency is between 10% and 80% [36]. The
developed model-based whitebox fuzzer achieves a code coverage of 33.59% and an effi-
ciency between 32.53% and 44.14%. Based on these results, it seems that the developed
model-based whitebox fuzzer is capable of detecting vulnerabilities.
Finally, the test results show that the model-based whitebox fuzzer is the best option for
fuzzing REST web services; compared with model-based blackbox fuzzing and traditional
whitebox fuzzing. This is because the model-based whitebox fuzzer can send more valid
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requests and gain higher code coverage than model-based blackbox fuzzing and traditional
whitebox fuzzing. In addition, the model-based whitebox fuzzer performed the strongest
since it was stateful. With the stored information in the stateful fuzzer, the fuzzer could
create more valid requests that access deeper locations within the endpoints that can only
be accessed with valid existing inputs.
6.4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the products of this research are a proposal for a model-based whitebox
fuzzing approach for fuzzing REST web services, a prototype capable of model-based white-
box fuzzing on REST web services based on the proposed approach and an evaluation of
the effectiveness of the proposed approach based on metrics.
This research tested the prototype on SutSqlI with known vulnerabilities, and experi-
ments are executed on real-world applications WooCommerce and Drupal. This research
compares the experiments with model-based whitebox fuzzing with the results of the ex-
periments with model-based blackbox fuzzing and traditional whitebox fuzzing. The re-
sults of these experiments show that model-based whitebox fuzzing is more effective than
the other two options. Because the prototype is stateful and uses sequences and targets
resources, it has a higher code coverage than the other two fuzzers. It also has a higher
chance of valid requests. With more valid requests, the fuzzer tests the deeper parts of the
SUT, which only are accessible for valid requests based on previously created objects. Tra-
ditional whitebox fuzzing comes close, but it was not able to perform a valid request on
Drupal.
6.5. FUTURE WORK
Future work could focus on different subjects. For example, the following subjects for fu-
ture work could help to improve the current prototype.
• More experiments - The current prototype is tested on two real-world applications.
More experiments could provide more data to confirm if model-based whitebox fuzzing
is the better option. With the obtained results, model-based whitebox fuzzing looks
like the more effective option. However, the results could be different for different
SUTs.
• Coverage guided - The current prototype builds on the rest-fuzzer project, which is
a model-based blackbox fuzzer. This fuzzer makes it possible to generate the code
coverage reports when the fuzzer finishes. However, run time code coverage could
result in a coverage guided approach. This would enable the fuzzer to target different
locations by manipulating the input generator.
• Different program languages - The current prototype can only get the code coverage
of PHP-based SUTs. Integrating the prototype with different languages would make
the prototype more useful for other projects.
• Analyse source code - The current prototype uses the OpenAPI specification to gen-
erate a model. The OpenAPI specification is popular and available in most languages.
However, not all vulnerabilities for REST web services can be discovered while using
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the OpenAPI specification. Different types of analysis can be performed to create a
fuzzer that can find more vulnerabilities if the source code would be available.
When necessary, the source code for the prototype and the modified SutSqlI project are







This final section covers a reflection on the process and developed products. These reflec-
tions cover some parts of the process that could have been executed in a perhaps better
way.
SUT selection During the research preparation, WooCommerce, Magento, PrestaShop
and Sylius were selected as SUT. However, from these SUTs, only WooCommerce made it as
a SUT. The other SUTs seemed too hard to use due to various reasons. Most were not shar-
ing their OpenAPI specification in a method that would be understandable for a machine.
Additionally, all SUTs had different modules to handle REST communication. However,
most of them were not editable within the time, which made it hard to track their code
coverage within the time.
It would have been good to know this before the testing environments were created.
Unfortunately, due to this, Drupal needed to be selected later during the research. This
could have been prevented by installing the SUTs before the main phase of this research
was started.
Traditional whitebox fuzzing During the second stage of this research, the fuzzer tools
needed to be selected to create the prototype. At that time, it was hard to find a whitebox
fuzzer that would work with the initially chosen SUTs. At a specific point, a greybox fuzzer
was considered to reduce the delay it was causing. Finally, just before the greybox fuzzer
was chosen, the PHP Vulnerability fuzzer was found by looking at older tools that were
archived.
Looking back at this, selecting both fuzzers in the preparation phase would have been
better. If it was not possible to find a whitebox fuzzer, the research questions could have
changed before the main phase of the research started.
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APPENDIX A: ATTACHED FILES
The directory structure of the supplied files in the folder "Attached files" of the thesis are as
follows:
1. Thesis source files - The LATEX source files of this thesis are available within the zip
folder: "Thesis - Model-Based Whitebox Fuzzing REST web services.zip".
2. PHP Vulnerability Hunter - The source code of PHP Vulnerability Hunter. During
the thesis, this tool functioned as a traditional whitebox fuzzer. The source files are
available within the zip folder: "PHP Vulnerability Hunter.zip".
3. Prototype - The source code of the prototype extending rest-fuzzer. This source code
makes it possible to perform different kinds of fuzzing on REST web services, e.g.,
model-based whitebox fuzzing, model-based blackbox fuzzing and model-based dic-
tionary fuzzing. The source files are available within the zip folder: "Prototype.zip".
From this prototype, the model-based whitebox fuzzer and model-based blackbox
fuzzer are new (including the frontend).
4. SutSqlI - The source code of the modified version of SutSqlI. The source files are
available within the zip folder: "SutSqlI.zip".
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APPENDIX B: MYSQL QUERIES
Listing 1: Query used to scan for SUTs with the HTTPS vulnerability
SELECT proj . * FROM ‘ rmd_suts ‘ sut LEFT JOIN ‘ fuz_projects ‘ proj ON sut
. id = proj . sut_id WHERE sut . location NOT LIKE ’%https ://% ’ AND proj
. id IN ( < project ids >)
Listing 2: Query used to scan for SUTs with a potential Access Control vulnerability
SELECT * FROM ‘ fuz_responses ‘ WHERE request_id IN ( s e l e c t id FROM ‘
fuz_requests ‘ WHERE project_id IN ( < project ids >) and (
header_parameters_json LIKE ’%token%’ or header_parameters_json
LIKE ’%key%’ ) ) AND status_code != 401
Listing 3: Query used to scan for SUTs with a potential Injection vulnerability
SELECT * FROM ‘ fuz_responses ‘ WHERE request_id IN ( s e l e c t id FROM ‘
fuz_requests ‘ WHERE project_id IN ( < project ids >) ) AND status_code
>= 500
Listing 4: Query used to scan for SUTs with a potential Validate content types vulnerability
SELECT * FROM ‘ fuz_responses ‘ WHERE request_id IN ( s e l e c t id FROM ‘
fuz_requests ‘ WHERE project_id IN ( < project ids >) and
header_parameters_json LIKE ’%content −type%’ ) AND status_code NOT
IN (406 , 415)
Listing 5: Query used to scan for SUTs with a potential Error handling vulnerability
SELECT * FROM ‘ fuz_responses ‘ WHERE project_id IN ( < project ids >) AND
status_code >= 500
Listing 6: Query used to scan for SUTs with a potential Sensitive information in HTTP requests vulnerability
SELECT * FROM ‘ fuz_requests ‘ WHERE project_id IN ( < project ids >) AND (
path_parameters_json LIKE ’%key%’ OR path_parameters_json LIKE ’%
l icense%’ OR path_parameters_json LIKE ’%tax%’ OR
path_parameters_json LIKE ’%passport%’ OR path_parameters_json LIKE
’%creditcard%’ OR path_parameters_json LIKE ’%password%’ )
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APPENDIX C: TEST CONFIGURATIONS
C.1. TRADITIONAL WHITEBOX FUZZER
Figure 1: Traditional whitebox fuzzer configuration for the WooCommerce REST web services
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Figure 2: Traditional whitebox fuzzer configuration for the Drupal REST web services
C.2. MODEL-BASED BLACKBOX FUZZER
Listing 7: Model-based blackbox fuzzing configuration for the WooCommerce REST web services
1 {
2 configurations : {
3 " authentication ": {
4 "method": "BASIC",
5 " username ": "root",
6 " password ": "root"
7 },
8 includeActions : [
9 {
10 path: ".*",
11 httpMethod : ".*"
12 }
13 ],
14 excludeActions : [
15 {
16 path: "/wp/v2/users/me",
17 httpMethod : ".*"
18 },
19 {
20 path: "/wp/v2/users /\\{id\\}",




24 excludeParameters : [],
25 defaults : []
26 },
27 maxSequenceLength : 1,
28 maxNumRequests : 100000,
29 duration : 120
30 }
Listing 8: Model-based blackbox fuzzing configuration for the Drupal REST web services
1 {
2 configurations : {
3 " authentication ": {
4 "method": "BASIC",
5 " username ": "root",
6 " password ": "root"
7 },
8 includeActions : [
9 {
10 path: ".*",
11 httpMethod : ".*"
12 }
13 ],
14 excludeActions : [
15 {
16 path: "/wp/v2/users/me",
17 httpMethod : ".*"
18 },
19 {
20 path: "/wp/v2/users /\\{id\\}",
21 httpMethod : "PATCH|POST|PUT"
22 }
23 ],
24 excludeParameters : [],
25 defaults : []
26 },
27 maxSequenceLength : 1,
28 maxNumRequests : 100000,
29 duration : 120
30 }
C.3. MODEL-BASED WHITEBOX FUZZER
Listing 9: Model-based whitebox fuzzing configuration for the WooCommerce REST web services
1 {
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2 configurations : {
3 " authentication ": {
4 "method": "BASIC",
5 " username ": "root",
6 " password ": "root"
7 },
8 includeActions : [
9 {
10 path: ".*",
11 httpMethod : ".*"
12 }
13 ],
14 excludeActions : [],




19 httpMethod : ".*"
20 },
21 parameter : {
22 name: " template |meta| subtype |status| username |roles
|parent",








31 httpMethod : ".*"
32 },
33 parameter : {
34 name: ".*",
35 required : ".*"
36 },




41 maxSequenceLength : 1,
42 maxNumRequests : 100000,
43 duration : 120,
44 thresholdRequiredNonFuzzableMinimumRequests : "1",
45 thresholdRequiredNonFuzzableValue : "1"
46 }
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Listing 10: Model-based whitebox fuzzing configuration for the Drupal REST web services
1 {
2 configuration : {
3 authentication : {
4 method: "BASIC",
5 username : "root",
6 password : "root"
7 },
8 includeActions : [
9 {
10 path: ".*",
11 httpMethod : ".*"
12 }
13 ],
14 excludeActions : [],




19 httpMethod : ".*"
20 },
21 parameter : {
22 name: " template |meta| subtype |status| username |roles
|parent",








31 httpMethod : ".*"
32 },
33 parameter : {
34 name: ".*",
35 required : ".*"
36 },




41 maxSequenceLength : 3,
42 maxNumRequests : 100000,
43 duration : 120,
44 thresholdRequiredNonFuzzableMinimumRequests : "1",
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45 thresholdRequiredNonFuzzableValue : "1"
46 }
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